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Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage
EREZ ALONI*
ABSTRACT
Scholars who have examined the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships in
European countries have concluded that the path to the legalization of same-sex
marriage follows an incremental process involving specific stages. They suggest that it
is possible to predict, based on certain visible social and legal processes or assessable
parameters, which U.S. states will be the next to recognize same-sex marriage. These
scholars argue that such small cumulative legal changes at the state level constitute the
best means of legalizing same-sex marriage in the United States, and that civil unions
are a necessary step in this process. This article shows that predictions based on these
theories have not been accurate and that attempts to generalize the experience of
legalizing same-sex marriage overlook a variety of often significant and sometimes subtle
social, political, and legal differences between the United States and Europe. Therefore,
these theories cannot sufficiently explain how social change happens and cannot be used
to formulate strategic plans for legalizing same-sex marriage in the United States. This
article also proposes that the adoption of civil unions can significantly delay legal
acceptance of same-sex marriage. It suggests that the theories overlooked the fact that in
some European countries, lesbian and gay organizations were more interested in
securing partnership rights for same-sex couples, rather than marriage itself. This path
is the one that advocates in the United States should take.
I.

INTRODUCTION

American scholars often look to the experiences of European states’
adoption of laws permitting same-sex marriage to lend credibility to their
recommendations for optimal political and social change strategies. Some of
these scholars have concluded that the legalization of same-sex marriage follows
an incremental legal progression through specific stages. They suggest that it is
possible to predict, based on certain visible social and legal processes or
assessable parameters, which state will be the next to recognize same-sex
marriage. Within this incrementalist paradigm, they view civil unions as a
necessary step prior to the complete legalization of same-sex marriage. These
scholars argue that small cumulative legal changes at the state level constitute

* Lecturer in Law and S.J.D. candidate, the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I have been
privileged to have extraordinary mentor, Anita L. Allen, whose assistance and support I am most
grateful for. I would also like to thank Yis Tigay, Abigail Yevnin, Michael Boucai, and Aziza Ahmed
for their assistance in reviewing early drafts and providing helpful input in the development of my
ideas. All errors and omissions are solely mine.
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the best means of bringing about the legalization of same-sex marriage in the
United States.
It is undoubtedly true that the European experience with the legal
recognition of same-sex partnerships enables understanding of the way in which
social and legal changes occur and provide insight into future changes. Yet
predictions based on the proposed theories concerning the path leading to the
legalization of same-sex marriage have been disproved and have shown that the
application of a general rule falls flat in a cascade of exceptions. An overview of
unfolding events on both continents casts more than a little doubt on the
accepted theory of incrementalism. In this Article, I argue that the attempt to
describe the experience of legalizing same-sex marriage in terms of one
overarching, globally shared process overlooks a variety of significant and
sometimes subtle social, political, and legal differences between the United
States and Europe. To this end, there is always going to be what I call a butterfly
effect—small variations of the initial condition of a dynamic system that may
produce large variations in the long-term behavior of the system. In this case,
unpredictable factors can influence the debate among (as well as strategies used
and actions taken by) policy makers and lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB)1
activists in pursuit of the legalization of same-sex marriage.

1. I use the term LGB to describe members who self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. In
doing so, I do not intend to erase or obscure other identities. I also frequently make reference to the
LGB “community,” a term that is a theoretical concept much more than it is a reality. This does not
mean that a monolithic community of LGB individuals exists in any meaningful way. At times, the
multitude of interests within this community converge; at other times, they diverge significantly.
Acknowledging this to be the case, I nevertheless refer to a “community” throughout this Article,
and I attempt to be clear about those times when interests within the community are most likely to
diverge, particularly vis-à-vis marriage. This article does not refer specifically to transgender
marriage because this raises questions concerning a state’s definition of male and female. For some
transgender individuals, the option to marry already exists, even in states that do not recognize
same-sex marriage. This is not to say that transgender people do not have an interest in same-sex
marriage, just that the rules for determining sex of a person are different from state to state and thus
involve different sets of legal rules. See generally Julia A. Greenberg, The Road Less Traveled: The
Problem with Binary Sex Categories 51-73, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006);
Gwen Cooper, Transgender Marriage, ETRANSGENDER (Feb. 24, 2006), http://etransgender.com/
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=74.
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The most accepted and widely cited2 theory of the path to the legalization
of same-sex marriage is that of Kees Waaldijk,3 which has been embraced and
advanced most notably by William N. Eskridge4 and Yuval Merin.5 They call
this theory the “law of small change,” the “step-by-step” approach, and the
“necessary process,” respectively. For the purposes of this Article, I refer to all
three designations jointly as “the theory of small change” or “incrementalism.”
Generally speaking, these scholars suggest that every country or state will, on its
path to the legalization of same-sex marriage, follow the same three-stage
process. In their model, change is initiated with the repeal of sodomy laws,
followed by the enactment of antidiscrimination laws protecting LGB people,
and then, if all goes as expected, this process culminates in the eventual
legalization of same-sex marriage. In Europe, this course has often been
followed by the equalization of parental rights. Extrapolating from the
European experience, these scholars have arrived at a number of conclusions.
First, they suggest that it is possible to predict when the legalization of
same-sex marriage will be achieved based on the stage a state is currently in. 6
Second, they assert that the enactment of civil unions into law expedites the
legalization of same-sex marriage by leading to the next step in the process and
is desirable because it can show the public that their fears about same-sex
partnership and its potential negative effects on society are groundless. Finally,
these scholars assert that the fight for LGB rights in the United States should

2. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human Rights Law and
Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 930 (2008) (asserting that the survey of international practices
“confirms, with only a few exceptions, Kees Waaldijk’s hypothesis of a ‘standard sequence’ of
‘legislative recognition’ of the human right to sexual freedom”); Reg Graycar & Jenni Millbank, From
Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to Relationship Recognition, 24 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 121, 138-40 (2007) (contending that even though such progress is not necessarily linear,
Australia and New Zealand generally follow the “law of small change”); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE
CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: FROM BOWERS TO LAWRENCE AND BEYOND, 101-03 (2005) (affirming Yuval
Merin’s theory of the “necessary process”); see also Brief of Liberty Counsel as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 23, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 470088, at
*23 (Liberty Counsel, an opponent of same-sex marriage, referred to the law of small change in order
to warn the Court about the consequences of repealing sodomy laws. It argued that if sodomy laws
were invalidated by the Supreme Court, same-sex marriage would be the next step. In its words,
“Waaldijk’s paper reveals that changes in the law tend to happen at a slow, incremental pace. This
Court, therefore, must keep in mind that this case is not just about invalidating sodomy laws, it is
about the goal of homosexuals to enter into the ‘clubhouse’ of family and marriage as it currently
exists so as to ‘radically alter’ th[ose] institution[s].”). But see Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners
but not Parents / Recognizing Parents but not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the
United States, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 713-14 (2000) (“Professor Waaldijk’s analysis of the
progression in Europe is wholly inapplicable to the United States. Some of the difference can be
attributed to the role of the judiciary in the American context.”).
3. Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands,
in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 437 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001) [hereinafter LEGAL
RECOGNITION].
4. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF GAY RIGHTS (2002).
5. See generally YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2002).
6. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 427.
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focus solely on changes at the state, rather than the federal level, because federal
law, which has not yet progressed to the second stage, is not ready for such a
great change.7 It is important to understand that the theory of small change is
not just a descriptive theory; instead, it provides a normative explanation for the
effect that each legal change has on the way society views LGB people. The
theory of small change also provides a theoretical justification for this
incremental progress. It holds that acceptance of same-sex marriage will be
perceived as a small step once all preceding steps have been achieved, thus
encouraging LGB organizations to follow these stages.
Professor of Economics M.V. Lee Badgett offers an important critique of the
theory of small change. She astutely warns that “[t]ransferring political lessons
and experiences from one continent to another runs the risk of ignoring
important cultural or social differences between countries and continents.”8 She
suggests that a “conditions for change” approach should supplement the theory
of small change in order to accurately predict legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships. This means taking account of certain factors: rates of heterosexual
cohabitation, levels of religiosity, and tolerance toward homosexuality. In
applying these factors to the United States, Badgett concludes that her empirical
approach “is at least as good as the incrementalist framework for predicting
change.”9
Unfortunately, neither Badgett’s empirical approach nor the incrementalist
approach provides a good framework for such predictions. Both theories
oversimplify the issue and fail to account for the complex and varied factors that
are relevant to same-sex marriage. In this Article I argue that the current legal
situation in Europe and the United States shows that there are various courses
through which the legalization of same-sex marriage can be achieved, and
various factors that affect the path to this goal. I present a range of examples in
which predictions have not corresponded to reality. Unlike the theory of small
change, which relies largely on the experience of the Netherlands and the
Scandinavian countries, my survey looks at all European Union member
countries. I use such extensive data because the available evidence from Great
Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and other Northern European
countries does not hold up to one storyline. Moreover, these Northern
European countries have very different attitudes toward—and definitions of—
civil rights than the rest of the world; therefore, any framework that uses their
experience, rather than that of other European countries, as the main source of
comparison is not a reliable one.

7. Eskridge and Spedale also argue that the United States should follow European states’
example in achieving acceptance of same-sex marriage through the legislature (rather than through
the courts). While I will not explore this idea in detail, the survey of the legal situation in Europe
shows that in recent years, European LGB people have very often turned to courts to achieve rights
for same-sex couples, including same-sex marriage. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & DARREN R.
SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 232-41
(2006).
8. M.V. Lee Badgett, Predicting Partnership Rights: Applying the European Experience in the United
States, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 85 (2005).
9. Id. at 84.
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Following the survey, I proceed to explain why these theories fail to fully
explain the process that leads to same-sex marriage. I contend that a main
problem with the theory of small change is the basic assumption that steps one
and two (i.e., repeal of sodomy laws and the enactment of antidiscrimination
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation) necessarily
lead to the third step—legalization of same-sex marriage. I argue that changing
legal definitions and societal understandings of marriage in both law and social
practice is quite different from conferring the right to engage in sexual acts and
the right not to be discriminated against. Marriage demands a public
affirmation that the theory of small change’s earlier stages do not consider.
Moreover, arguments against legalizing same-sex marriage, although standing
on equally shaky theoretical ground, are more entrenched than are arguments in
favor of sodomy laws and against antidiscrimination laws that extend
protections on the basis of sexual orientation. I assert that because of these
factors, changes to marriage laws in the United States will never be perceived as
small, no matter what prior steps have been taken.
In the next Part, contrary to those who take a more incrementalist
approach, I argue that the adoption of civil unions is sometimes a stumbling
block that can significantly delay legal acceptance of same-sex marriage.
Granting LGB people the option of civil unions rather than marriage obfuscates
the problem of discrimination against same-sex couples. Under most civil union
arrangements, especially in Europe, same-sex couples receive the same rights
and benefits as their opposite-sex counterparts. Thus, the general public
perceives any discussion of ongoing discrimination, particularly in terms of the
denial of marriage to LGB couples, as merely semantic. In addition, since civil
unions often confer upon LGB people all the economic rights and benefits
associated with marriage, they mitigate the economic incentives that can
motivate activists’ efforts to legalize same-sex marriage. Furthermore, some
LGB people find civil unions preferable to marriage because they see the latter
as a patriarchal and discriminatory institution, or, in certain European countries,
because the declining value of marriage has made it a less desirable option. In
arguing that civil unions might impede the legalization of same-sex marriage, I
do not mean to imply that legal recognition of same-sex marriage should be the
final goal of the LGB movement, as suggested by the theoreticians of small
change.10 In fact, it seems that the lesson that the theory of small change misses
is that many European LGB organizations object to same-sex marriage and are
more interested in securing partnership rights for same-sex couples. To the
extent that same-sex marriage is the goal, however, the effect of civil unions and
the incremental approach should be clear.
The structure of this Article is as follows: Part II presents a short overview
of the ways that same-sex relationships are currently recognized in the
European Union and the United States in order to explain the terminology used
in this Article. Part III offers a review of the existing theories on this subject.
Part IV surveys the legal recognition of same-sex couples in Europe and in the

10. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 239 (“This is not to say we believe that gay and lesbian
advocates and their allies should stop fighting for the immediate right to same-sex marriage. Full
marriage equality is the ultimate goal of most gays and lesbians in the United States…”).
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United States and demonstrates that many of the predictions posited by the
theory of small change have not been accurate. Instead, the theory of small
change has not proved to be a reliable method for predicting the legalization of
same-sex marriage. Part V critiques the empirical approach offered by Badgett.
Part VI questions the assumption that a country, state, or society that is willing
to decriminalize homosexual acts and enact antidiscrimination laws will
necessarily be open to legalizing same-sex marriage. This Part also suggests that
changes concerning marriage in the United States are never perceived as small.
Part VII investigates the assumption that the introduction of the institution of
civil unions raises sufficient awareness of inequalities faced by opposite-sex
couples and demonstrates that some European LGB organizations and people
have been more interested in securing partnership rights rather than marriage.
It also suggests that there is a normative commitment from the side of the
incrementalists to positing marriage as the end of the LGB struggle for equality.
Part VIII offers a brief conclusion.
II. CURRENT MODELS OF RECOGNIZING SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS
Today there are numerous legal institutions in Europe and the United
States that offer varying degrees of legal recognition to same-sex couples.11 It is
common to divide these institutions into three groups or models—civil
marriage, registered partnerships, and cohabitation—based on the type of legal
recognition that they provide.12
Civil marriage is a registered partnership between two persons that results
in a number of legal rights and obligations (between partners and between the
couple and others, including the state). The law regulates numerous aspects of
the relationship, including how to terminate the marriage.13 Marriage continues
to be the privileged and preferred legal status in Europe and the United States
and provides the most expansive recognition of rights by the state.14 The legal
differences between marriage and other alternatives carry additional
consequences. For example, some entities do not treat registered couples as
married because they do not understand, or do not want to understand, what it
means. This can have serious legal implications in everyday life, for example,
when one needs the help of an administrative agency or any other kind of semistate entity.15 Civil marriage also carries a semantic advantage over other kinds

11. These forms of legal recognition include, marriage, civil unions, registered partnerships,
reciprocal beneficiary schemes, informal cohabitation, and registered domestic partnerships.
12. Kees Waaldijk, Levels of Legal Consequences of Marriage, Cohabitation and Registered Partnership
for Different-Sex and Same-Sex Partners: Comparative Overview & Comparative Analysis, in SAME-SEX
COUPLES, SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS & HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGES: A FOCUS ON CROSS-NATIONAL
DIFFERENTIALS [hereinafter CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS] 47, 48 (Marie Digoix & Patrick Festy
eds., 2004).
13. Id. at 77-78.
14. MERIN, supra note 5, at 55-56.
15. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY
EQUALITY 114-15 (2004) (the story of Michele Granda and Kate Hogan, a lesbian couple who were on
vacation in the British Virgin Islands when Ms. Hogan was injured in an accident. The couple had in
their possession various documents to ensure that they would be allowed hospital visitation, yet Ms.
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of legal recognition—while almost everybody in the world knows what
marriage is, the meaning of other forms of legal recognition, like civil unions, is
often less clear.16
The second model, registered partnership,17 is conceived of as a legal
institution more or less analogous to marriage—essentially an intermediate level
of recognition, sometimes referred to as “marriage lite.”18 A registered
partnership, like marriage, results in a number of legal rights and obligations
(between partners and between the couple and others, including the state),19 and
certain actions must be taken in order to terminate a registered partnership.20 It
is important to emphasize that the institution of registered partnership takes
different forms in different countries and states. In some countries and states, a
registered partnership scheme offers nearly all the rights that are associated with
marriage, while in others this legal institution does not confer many of those
rights.21 In most places, such as Great Britain and Germany, registered
partnerships are open only to same-sex couples.22 In some countries, however,
Granda was not allowed to see her partner in the emergency room. A friend later said: “‘you can do
some things’ with those documents . . . ‘but you cannot replicate marriage.’”).
16. What do same-sex couples who have had civil unions call the ceremony? How do they refer
to their new status, or to each other? It is even more complicated for couples who register as
reciprocal beneficiaries. Was I “unioned” yesterday with the love of my life? Do I send out
announcements stating: “You are all invited to our registered reciprocal beneficiaries ceremony”?
The symbolic value of marriage extends beyond the name of the ceremony. For example, in France,
heterosexual marriages are performed at the town hall, a culturally important place, while same-sex
couples can register as partners only at the tribunal d’instance, a court that usually deals with dailylife conflicts like disputes between property owners and tenants. See Wilfried Rault, The Best Way to
Court: The French Mode of Registration and Its Impact on the Social Significance of Partnerships, in CROSSNATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 27. On the other hand, in some European countries, the
names of marriage alternatives have, in the same way as the word “marriage,” become an integral
part of the language. For example, in France, the pacte civil de solidarité (civil pact of solidarity,
known as PaCS, and discussed later in this article) “is now part of the culture, as evidenced by its
acceptance in the French language: the acronym PaCS is no longer capitalized, as both noun—les
pacsés—and verb—se pacser—have entered everyday parlance.” Daniel Borrillo & Eric Fassin, The
Pacs, Four Years Later: A Beginning or an End?, in CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at
19.
17. This is the European equivalent of the American civil union. For the purposes of this
Article, I will refer to these two legal institutions interchangeably.
18. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 80.
19. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (West Supp. 2010) (“‘Civil union’ means the legally
recognized union of two eligible individuals of the same sex established pursuant to this act. Parties
to a civil union shall receive the same benefits and protections and be subject to the same
responsibilities as spouses in a marriage.”).
20. E.g., Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33, § 44 (U.K.) (“Subject to section 41, an application for a
dissolution order may be made to the court by either civil partner on the ground that the civil
partnership has broken down irretrievably.”).
21. For example, registered partnership in Great Britain provides same-sex couples all the rights
and benefits that are offered to opposite-sex couples. Conversely, in France, Finland, Ireland, and
Austria, gay couples cannot jointly adopt even if they are registered. See, e.g., Kees Waaldijk,
Overview of Forms of Joint Legal Parenting Available to Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 72 DROIT
ET SOCIÉTÉ 383, 384 (2009). In addition, couples in civil unions are often required to demonstrate
more committed behavior, such as living together for a number of years, while married couples are
not required to behave similarly in order to register. See Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to
Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1203-04 (2010).
22. Waaldijk, supra note 12, at 49.
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including France and the Netherlands, the registration is also open to oppositesex couples.23
Civil unions and registered partnerships not only carry legal and symbolic
distinctions but also have practical adverse consequences. Some argue that
there are negative effects of civil unions on the physical and mental health of
same-sex couples and their children due to the stigma of living in a separatebut-equal regime. Some employers do not extend to couples in civil unions the
rights and benefits that they grant married couples.24
For many years, numerous countries did not officially recognize the third
form of legal recognition, cohabitation. In the United States during the second
half of the twentieth century, some states began recognizing and enforcing
marriage-like contracts in which the parties committed to marriage-like
obligations.25 Progressively, new laws that at least partly recognize certain
kinds of cohabitation have been developed, mostly in Europe.26 Today, many
countries provide a number of legal consequences that arise when two people
have been informally cohabitating for a certain period of time. In these
countries, even in the absence of a contract, a court may, at the request of one
party, enforce a marriage-like commitment on the other party.27 Usually there is
no event or formal agreement marking or governing cohabitation, making this
arrangement different from both marriage and registered partnerships. This is
the only legal arrangement in which the partners must actively demand their
rights in retrospect and provide proof of the nature and extent of their
relationship to a government agency or court. It is also the only model that does
not require an act of termination. The need for legal recognition frequently
arises at the end of the relationship—when the couple dissolves the relationship
or when one partner dies. This means that cohabiting status is often required by
only one partner. In other places, cohabiting couples can register their

23. Id. In the United States, civil unions have only recently become an option for opposite-sex
couples as well (Nevada, the District of Columbia, and Illinois). See, e.g., Monica Davey, Civil Unions
Advance in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/12/02/us/02illinois.html (“The legislation allows heterosexual couples to seek civil unions,
too.”).
24. See N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM’N, THE LEGAL, MED., ECON. & SOC. CONSEQUENCES OF
NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW (2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcr/downloads/CURCFinal-Report-.pdf (reporting that some New Jersey employers refuse to provide the same benefits to
employees’ civil union partners that are provided to employees’ opposite-sex spouses. These
employers are governed by the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA). Since DOMA
limits benefits to the opposite-sex partners of employees, and ERISA is a federal law, these
employers are not required to recognize same-sex partnerships.)
25. See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1568 (2009) (“Since the last decades of the twentieth
century, however, there is a trend to narrow the gap between the mutual obligations of cohabitants
and those of married partners.”).
26. See Kathleen Kiernan, The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western
Europe, 15 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1 (2001).
27. Waaldijk, supra note 12, at 83.

Aloni_proof_022311

2/23/2011 12:48:26 PM

THE POSSIBILITY OF PREDICTING LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

113

partnerships, which make them eligible for a limited set of rights (even more
limited than those conferred by a civil union).28
Cohabitation, both informal and registered, provides fewer privileges than
the other models discussed here.29 Many benefits, especially in the areas of
parental, tax, and property law, are not available to cohabiting couples. The
regulations of cohabitation are very fragmentary, and only a comprehensive
overview of these laws and regulations could fully demonstrate the legal
consequences of cohabitation.30 In addition, the rights conferred by cohabitation
vary from country to country. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the
rights of cohabiting partners are numerous, even greater than those extended to
couples in registered partnerships in France.31 In most European countries, this
form of recognition is available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples.32
Discrimination, however, often exists within this model: for example, same-sex
couples are often denied many of the parental rights granted to opposite-sex
couples, such as the right to adopt or subsidization of assisted reproduction
technologies.33
In the United States, domestic partnership laws vary considerably among
jurisdictions.34 In some states, domestic partnerships are the equivalent of
European registered cohabitation, and the rights conferred by registration are
limited.35 In other jurisdictions, notably California, domestic partnerships are
equivalent to civil unions because it provides all or almost all the rights
associated with marriage, but limited to the state level.36 In the United States,
where marriage is usually a prerequisite for obtaining benefits for an employee’s
partner, domestic partnership laws allow same-sex couples to enjoy the same
health care benefits as married couples.
III. THE THEORY OF SMALL CHANGE
The most accepted and recognized international theory that explains and
predicts the legalization of same-sex marriage and advocates the notion of
incremental progress is Waaldijk’s law of small change.37 This theory not only
describes how the Netherlands arrived at the legalization of same-sex marriage
but also uses that data to predict “how, and when, [the legalization of] same-sex
marriage can be achieved in other countries”38 and to suggest a political and
28. Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and SemiMarriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 570-71 (2004); MERIN,
supra note 5, at 136.
29. See generally Waaldijk, supra note 28.
30. See Waaldijk, supra note 12, at 78-79.
31. See id. at 83-84.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 83.
34. Domestic partnership registries are often offered by cities, towns, employers, and
universities. This article addresses only domestic partnerships recognized by states (and the District
of Columbia). See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-701 (2001).
35. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (2005).
36. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004).
37. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 440.
38. Id. at 437.
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legal strategy for the legalization of same-sex marriage. According to Waaldijk,
the legal history of the recognition of homosexuality in European countries
reveals a pattern of steady incremental progress leading to the legal acceptance
of same-sex marriage.39 This process consists of three stages, each of which
entails several sub-steps. The process is initiated with the decriminalization of
sodomy, after which the age of consent for same-sex relationships is made the
same as that for opposite-sex relationships (step one). Following this, legislation
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the workplace
and housing is enacted and sexual orientation is included as a protected
category in hate crime laws (step two). Finally, partnership and parenting rights
are legally addressed (step three).40
Waaldijk argues that this theory offers two crucial lessons. First, a step
only becomes possible once the previous step has been fulfilled. Second, each
step facilitates the next step. Any legislative change offering legal recognition
and acceptance of homosexuality can be enacted and accepted by the general
public only if this change is perceived as small or insignificant. At the same
time, the new legal reality must remain sufficiently discriminatory against LGB
people to satisfy the opponents of LGB rights.41
Waaldijk shows how Dutch law followed the pattern proposed by the law
of small change. After passing through the first two steps, the Netherlands
began to address partnership issues by offering limited rights to cohabiting
same-sex couples. The process continued with the introduction of a registered
partnership scheme and eventually ended with the legalization of same-sex
marriage. Finally, parental rights for married same-sex couples were made
equal to those of married opposite sex couples.42 Waaldijk suggests that
countries typically offer registered partnership schemes prior to legalizing samesex marriage. He explains that the introduction of registered partnerships put
pressure on the Dutch legislature to allow same-sex couples to marry because it
“served to highlight the remaining discrimination caused by the exclusion of
same-sex couples from marriage.”43 Waaldijk ultimately posits that his theory
applies to other countries as well.44
Merin imports the theory of small change to the United States and clarifies
what he sees as the “necessary process” leading to legalization of same-sex

39. It is important to note that Waaldijk characterizes the final stage of recognition only in
vague terms, describing it as “legislation recognizing same-sex partnership and parenting.” Id. at
440. Does recognition extend to registered partnerships or same-sex marriage? Or perhaps
cohabiting same-sex couples? Waaldijk’s examination of the process as it unfolded in the
Netherlands suggests that “recognition” actually encompasses all these elements as sub-stages that
lead to the acceptance of same-sex marriage, starting with acceptance of cohabitation.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See also Polikoff, supra note 2, at 712 (“The European legislation signaled a total separation of
the approval of lesbian and gay couples as partners from the approval of lesbian and gay couples as
parents. In the United States, meanwhile, trial courts had approved joint adoptions in more than
half the states . . . .”).
43. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 447.
44. Id. at 439 (“The Netherlands is following the same trends as most other European countries.
In that light, the opening up of marriage to same-sex couples is only natural.”).

Aloni_proof_022311

2/23/2011 12:48:26 PM

THE POSSIBILITY OF PREDICTING LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

115

marriage.45 He accepts the three-stage process and concludes that “[b]efore
same-sex marriage becomes possible, the final step of the necessary process
must be completed, namely, broad recognition in the form of registered
partnership or civil union—not merely a version of U.S. domestic partner
scheme as currently construed.”46 In other words, Merin suggests that the
introduction of civil unions must always precede the legalization of same-sex
marriage.
Eskridge advances the theory of small change by offering a more nuanced
and sophisticated approach that addresses the important component of social
attitudes.47 He suggests that the “law cannot move unless public opinion
moves, but public attitudes can be influenced by changes in the law.”48
Accordingly, as legislation gives more visibility to LGB individuals, society
becomes more accepting of them. The more society accepts LGB individuals, the
easier it is to advance pro-gay changes in law and to legalize same-sex marriage.
Eskridge thus concludes that “a step-by-step approach is probably a necessary
way to overcome the politics of disgust so popular in the United States.”49
Eskridge also uses the theory of small change to defend the institution of
civil unions. He argues that the Netherlands’ recognition of same-sex marriage
was facilitated by its prior recognition of, and successful experience with, the
registered partnership scheme. He suggests that civil unions are only one stage
that inevitably leads to legal acceptance of same-sex marriage and therefore the
LGB community should accept civil unions as a necessary step in this process.50
Badgett offers another model for predicting the legal recognition of samesex partnerships, based on the European experience, but she uses an empirical

45. MERIN, supra note 5, at 308-37.
46. Id. at 333.
47. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 4; ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition,
31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 641 (2000) [hereinafter Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate];
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64
ALB. L. REV. 853 (2001).
48. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 115.
49. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 229. The politics of disgust is driven by emotional
response. According to Eskridge and Spedale, this form of politics is most commonly seen in the
context of attacks on gays and lesbians because many Americans are disgusted by the idea of
nonprocreative sex. See id. at 220-23.
50. Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, supra note 47, at 650-52. Finally, Eskridge
suggests that within the federalist structure, the incremental process will create islands of
recognition of same-sex partnerships. Some states will offer same-sex couples the option of
marriage, others civil unions, and gradually recognition of same-sex couples will become
contagious, especially among younger generations. As events unfold, more states will come to
accept that same-sex marriage does not actually have detrimental effects on society. Eskridge
concludes that the same-sex marriage debate should be a normative debate primarily at the state—
rather than the national— level. Since some U.S. states have only recently repealed their sodomy
laws, and the second stage of the theory of small change has not been achieved at the federal level
(i.e., federal antidiscrimination law does not provide protection on the basis of sexual orientation),
the United States is not ready for such a great change. In addition, past experience with
controversial legal issues in the United States, such as miscegenation laws, shows that the Supreme
Court will not get involved in the early stages of debate but will do so only when the majority of
states have made the change. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 234-47.
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method to do so. I will discuss this method in depth in Part V. In the next Part,
I will examine whether the predictions offered by the theory of small change
have been realized.
IV. A CROSS-NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE THEORY OF
SMALL CHANGE
This Part presents a description of the legal situation of same-sex
partnerships in Europe and the United States. As the following discussion
demonstrates, the evaluations and predictions offered so far do not stand on
solid ground. A survey of the current legal situation in Europe and in the
United States is necessary, since Waaldijk’s and Merin’s theories are based on
comparative law in 2000 and 2002, respectively. Although Eskridge’s analysis is
more recent, some important events have taken place since 2006 that illustrate
the weakness of the theory of small change. Therefore, an updated comparative
law survey is necessary in order to examine if, in retrospect, the theory’s
predictions have been accurate.
As early as 2003, an article published by the members of the Harvard Law
Review began to cast doubt on the “positive” effect that civil unions have on the
path to same-sex marriage in Europe.51 The article, which responded to the
theory of small change, argued that “rapid change is far from the rule in Europe.
To the contrary, the European experience provides considerable evidence that
progress may stall, perpetuating the second-class status of same-sex couples.”52
Moreover, the article astutely noted that “‘small change’ need not mean ‘slow
change.’”53 In light of these observations, this Part questions whether civil
unions are only a temporary stage in the struggle for legal recognition of samesex marriage or whether there is evidence that civil unions impede the
legalization of same-sex marriage. It also tests the three-stage assumption by
looking at whether all the countries and states that have legalized same-sex
marriage followed the three necessary steps.
Waaldijk and Eskridge54 base their theories primarily on a comparison of
the United States with the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. These
countries, however, are unique in terms of their social, cultural, and legal
contexts and thus cannot be said to represent a larger European phenomenon.
The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands share the social model of the
Nordic countries—a generous welfare state and a strong focus on human
rights.55 Therefore, these countries demonstrate only the “‘friendly human
51. Developments in the Law – II. Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004 (2003) [hereinafter Inching
Down the Aisle].
52. Id. at 2010.
53. Id. at 2009.
54. In his book Equality Practice, Eskridge, offers a comparison of the laws of a variety of other
countries. In his latest book, Gay Marriage for Better or Worse, he and co-author Darren R. Spedale
focus mainly on the experience of the Nordic countries.
55. TORBEN M. ANDERSEN ET AL., THE RESEARCH INST. OF THE FINNISH ECON., THE NORDIC
MODEL: EMBRACING GLOBALIZATION AND SHARING RISKS (2007), available at http://www.etla.fi/
files/1892_the_nordic_model_complete.pdf; see also Philip Jenkins, Religious America and Secular
Holland (paper presented at the “Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations” conference, Oct. 15-
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rights competition’ of the Nordic countries.”56 In addition, recent research
claims that “[g]ender equality . . . emerged earlier in the Nordic countries than
elsewhere in Europe” and thus suggests that the Nordic countries demonstrate
the “Nordic Model of Marriage”—a unique progressive and equal attitude
toward marriage and divorce.57 Because they are not representative of the
European context as a whole, an examination of other members of the European
Union, especially the influential legal systems of Germany, France, and Great
Britain, is necessary.
It is important to keep in mind that the European experience is inherently
different from that of the United States. Because the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) has held that sodomy laws contradict58 the principles of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,59
every country in the European Union that once had sodomy laws has repealed
them. In addition, every member of the European Union has enacted
antidiscrimination laws that protect LGB people as a prerequisite for
membership in the European Union.60 Conversely, in the United States, while
sodomy laws are unconstitutional, only twenty states extend protection on the
basis of sexual orientation in their antidiscrimination laws,61 and federal
antidiscrimination law does not include sexual orientation as a protected
category.62 Thus, discussion of the European Union member countries will
focus mainly on the level of legal recognition of same-sex partnerships. I will
use the common method of dividing Europe into four geographical areas:
Northern, Western, Southern, and Eastern.
A. Same-Sex Partnership Recognition in Europe
Northern Europe: The Nordic countries63 were the first to recognize samesex partnerships and still lead in their extensive recognition of LGB rights.
Generally speaking, they followed the stages of the theory of small change.
Since Denmark introduced the option of registered partnerships for same-sex
couples in 1989, analogous laws have been enacted in all four other

16, 2009), available at http://www.roosevelt.nl/Content/RSC/docs/ Jenkins.pdf (“For multiple
reasons, it is extremely difficult to compare the US and the Netherlands.”).
56. Inching Down the Aisle, supra note 51, at 2010 (quoting Robert Wintemute, Conclusion to
LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 759, 770-71).
57. Kari Melby et al., The Nordic Model of Marriage, 15 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 651 (2006).
58. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (1981).
59. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
60. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 13, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340).
61. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES, available at
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Employment_Laws_and_Policies.pdf (last updated July 26, 2010);
see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(a)- 81(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., art. 49B § 5
(LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2009).
62. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) to (e)-17 (2006).
63. I use the terms “Scandinavia” and “the Nordic countries” interchangeably to refer to all
members in the Nordic Council, namely, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden.
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Scandinavian countries:64 Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland. Sweden,
Norway, and Iceland recently amended their marriage laws, making them
gender neutral.65 In Finland there are signs that same-sex marriage will be
legalized soon.66
Even after the introduction of registered partnerships, same-sex couples
were still denied some rights and benefits across the Nordic countries. In
Denmark, for example, same-sex couples were denied the access to subsidized
assisted reproductive technologies until 2007,67 and it was not until 2010 that the
law was amended to allow joint adoption by same-sex couples.68
Even though the Nordic countries followed the incremental process,
Denmark is an exception to the rule. Denmark’s proposal to allow same-sex
couples to marry was rejected by the government in 2006. When the Danish
parliament debated whether or not to legalize same-sex marriage, the Danish
Minister for the Family, Carina Christensen, argued that since civil unions
already provide all the rights enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples to samesex couples (except for the ability to marry in a church), registered partnerships
are satisfactory and not discriminatory.69
The Nordic countries offer a challenge to the theory of small change
because they illustrate the double-edged nature of registered partnerships. On
the one hand, the Nordic countries were the first to enact laws regulating samesex relationships and have since generally followed the theory of small change—
they all gradually fixed inequities faced by same-sex couples. Norway, Sweden,
and Iceland even took the final step and now legally recognize same-sex
marriage.70 On the other hand, Denmark provides striking proof of the
problems associated with registered partnerships—change is slow. Denmark
was the first country to recognize same-sex relationships twenty years ago, but it
currently remains at the same level of limited recognition, with no signs of
change on the horizon.

64. Jens Rydström, From Outlaw to In-Law on Registered Partnerships for Homosexuals in
Scandinavia, Its History and Cultural Implications, in CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at
175.
65. Norway: Same-Sex Marriage Permitted, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/world/europe/18briefings-SAMESEXMARRI_BRF.html;
Iceland
Passes Gay Marriage Law in Unanimous Vote, REUTERS, June 11, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE65A3V020100611.
66. See Gender-Neutral Marriage Law Possible by 2012, YLE, http://www.yle.fi/ uutiset/news/
2010/07/gender-neutral_marriage_law_possible_by_2012_1804013.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
67. Jens Rydström, Legalizing Love in a Cold Climate: The History, Consequences and Recent
Developments of Registered Partnership in Scandinavia, 11 SEXUALITIES 193, 209 (2008).
68. Gays Given Equal Adoption Rights, COPENHAGEN POST, May 5, 2010, http://www.cphpost.dk/
component/content/48896.html?task=view.
69. Carina Christensen, Minister for the Family (Den.), Address to Parliament on Proposal for a
Parliamentary Decision to Introduce a Marriage Law that Equates Homosexuals with Heterosexuals
(Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.ft.dk/dokumenter/tingdok.aspx?/samling/20061/beslutningsforslag/
b76/beh1/1/forhandling.htm&startItem=#nav.
70. Generally, even when the Swedish experience, which took fourteen years to move from civil
unions to marriage, is taken into account, the experience of Nordic countries suggests a theory of
slow change rather than small change, because progress has been so very markedly slow.
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Western Europe: All the countries in this region of Europe have enacted
laws recognizing same-sex relationships. Belgium71 and the Netherlands both
allow same-sex couples to marry. The rest—France, Germany, Great Britain,
Luxemburg, Ireland,72 and Austria73—offer the option of registered
partnerships, each with its own unique characteristics. Belgium, France, and
Germany also recognize cohabitation of same-sex couples.74
France and Germany: In 1999, France enacted the pacte civil de solidarité
(PaCS), which is open to both same- and opposite-sex couples. The PaCS is very
popular in France, especially among opposite-sex couples.75 One of the limited
legal institutions recognizing same-sex partnerships in Europe, the PaCS is a
contract76 and is not part of the marriage section of the civil code.77 The PaCS is
not just symbolically different from marriage; it is legally different as well. A
registered PaCS may be terminated without judicial intervention and does not

71. See Paul Borghs & Bart Eeckhout, LGB Rights in Belgium, 1999-2007: A Historical Survey of a
Velvet Revolution, 24 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1 (2010). In 2003, Belgium became the second country to
open up the institution of civil marriage to same-sex couples, when the parliament amended the
country’s civil code. Belgium also offers a registered-cohabitation option, open to both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples, providing limited rights. However, same-sex couples did not, until recently,
have the right to adoption of any kind, and only in 2006 did the parliament pass a bill permitting
same-sex couples to adopt. According to Waaldijk, Belgium also followed the law of small change.
However, it is interesting to note that Belgium first addressed partnership rights by offering legal
recognition to same-sex cohabiting couples, even though it provided only a minimal level of
recognition, and later by enacting antidiscrimination laws. Waaldijk, supra note 28, at 572.
72. See Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988). After this decision, Ireland, a
predominantly Catholic country, decriminalized homosexual sex in 1993, declaring that statutes
criminalizing homosexual sex violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Until then, decriminalization was at the heart of the gay
community’s campaign for equality. See also Fergus Ryan, From Stonewall(s) to Picket Fences: The
Mainstreaming of Same-Sex Couples in Contemporary Legal Discourses, in COMMITTED RELATIONSHIPS
AND THE LAW 1, 10 (Oran Doyle & William Binchy eds., 2007); Charlie Taylor, Civil Partnership Bill
Signed into Law, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 8, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/
2010/0719/breaking29.html (A Civil Partnership bill was signed into law in 2010, but it is very
unlikely that same-sex marriage will be offered in Ireland any time soon.).
73. See Austrian Parliament Adopts Registered Partnership Law for Same-Sex Partners, INT’L LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX ASSOC. (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/
guide/country_by_country/austria/austrian_parliament_adopts_registered_partnership_law_for_s
ame_sex_partners (In 2010, after many efforts by the LGB community, a registered partnership bill
was signed into law in Austria.).
74. See CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 40 (In France, for example, both samesex and opposite-sex couples can register for a certificat de concubinage notoire, which offers minimal
rights and responsibilities and has uncomplimentary overtones. The situation of concubinage only
allows for certain benefits received by one partner to be extended to the other partner and does not
offer assistance on issues regarding property, taxes, etc.).
75. In 2009, for example, 175,000 PaCS’s were registered, as opposed to 256,000 marriages, and
only 5 percent were same-sex couples. Deux pacs pour trois mariages, INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA
STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONONOMIQUES, http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/ipweb/ip1276/
ip1276.pdf.
76. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 515-1 (Fr.). (“A civil covenant of solidarity is a contract entered into
by two natural persons of age, of different sexes or of a same sex, to organize their common life.”).
77. Joëlle Godard, PACS Seven Years On: Is it Moving Towards Marriage?, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y &
FAM. 310, 312 (2007) (“According to Article 515-1Civ.C, Pacs is a contract . . . .”).
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confer nationality on non-French citizens.78 The law discriminates between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples with regard to prenatal rights.79 In 2006, a
few amendments beneficial to PaCS couples were made, such as providing
better protection for the surviving partner in the event of the death of an
individual in a PaCS,80 but the essence of its character has not changed.81 Samesex couples in France still lack basic parental rights, and a challenge to
discriminatory adoption policies is currently pending in the ECHR.82
Daniel Borrillo and Eric Fassin point out that since the passage of the PaCS
legislation, both the LGB movement’s pressure on the government and the
intensity of the debate have decreased;83 those who supported the PaCS in the
beginning now fear that it has led to a “dead end.”84 Some have argued that the
changes to the PaCS in 2006 were intended to decrease pressure on the
government to move forward with the legalization of same-sex marriage.85 In a
recent development, the Court of Cassation, the country’s highest court of

78. See Rault, supra note 16, at 27 (Like the registration process, conflicts between the partners
are dealt with by the tribunal d’instance, not by the juge aux affaires familiales, who is authorized to
address marriage issues.).
79. The greatest absurdity was that until 2008, single women were eligible for subsidized
artificial insemination, while same-sex couples were not. Generally, all parental rights—except for
cross-adoption—were prohibited. However, recent intervention by the ECHR somewhat rectified
the matter. E.B. v France, App. No. 43546/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int. In February 1998, a woman in a same-sex couple applied for approval as a
possible adoptive parent, but her application was rejected because of her sexual orientation. In June
2002, the Conseil d'État upheld the rejection of her application. She argued that the decision was a
breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. Article 8 guarantees the right to a private family life, while Article 14
stipulates that the enjoyment of such rights must be secured without discrimination on any grounds.
In 2008, the ECHR held that in rejecting the woman’s application for authorization to adopt, the
domestic French authorities had made a distinction based on considerations regarding her sexual
orientation, a distinction that is unacceptable under the Convention. Therefore, it seems that this
decision applies to all of the countries that are parties to the Convention and allow two single people
to adopt children. It is not yet certain how each country will react to it and what the implications
will be.
80. Loi 2006-728 du 23 juin 2006 portant réforme des successions et des libéralités [Law 2006-728
of June 23, 2006 on the Reform of Inheritance and Gifts], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 24, 2006, p. 9513.
81. Since 2008, same-sex couples who marry abroad have been able to gain recognition in
France as married couples for tax purposes only. This change came about after a Dutch male couple
who had married legally in the Netherlands sought official recognition of their marriage in France.
Jean-Pierre Stroobants, La France reconnaît le mariage d’un couple d’hommes néerlandais, LE MONDE,
Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/09/05/la-france-reconnait-le-mariaged-un-couple-d-hommes-neerlandais_1091846_3214.html (Fr.).
82. Gas v. France, App. No. 25951/07 (challenging the denial of a lesbian couple’s request for
cross-adoption).
83. Borrillo & Fassin, supra note 12, at 19.
84. Borrillo and Fassin, however, acknowledge that the PaCS did have a positive effect on
society in that society has generally become more tolerant of LGB relationships. Yet the law is still
frozen and has not followed subsequent changes in society. Id. at 25 (“This means that the law
shapes society, of course; but as society evolves, the law may have soon enough to catch up with
further evolutions of society. Unless outside pressure (from the European Union) forces change,
without waiting for public opinion.”).
85. Godard, supra note 77, at 318.
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appeals, ordered the Constitutional Council to rule on whether the French ban
on same-sex marriage violates the state constitution.86
The German Lower House of Parliament adopted a bill titled the Law on
Ending Discrimination against Same-Sex Communities: Lifetime Partnership
Act, which came into full force in 2001. Unlike the PaCS, the life partnership
law mainly duplicates the part of the German civil code that governs marriage
between members of the opposite sex and offers this option only to same-sex
couples.87 Following a recent ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, samesex couples are eligible for all the rights that are associated with marriage.88
However, it is not clear that Germany is headed toward legalization of same-sex
marriage, because it appears that same-sex marriage will probably face a
constitutional challenge.89 Recently, a gay couple who married in Canada asked
the German Court to recognize their marriage. The Court recognized their
marriage as a lifetime partnership, not as a marriage.90
86. Drew Singer, France Court Orders Review of Same-Sex Marriage Ban, JURIST (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/11/france-court-%20orders-review-of-same-sex-marriageban.php. This is an interesting development: even if the Constitutional Council decides that the ban
on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional, this situation demonstrates why the generalization of the
European experience provides an unreliable legal framework. Eskridge and Spedale argue that “[a]
very important lesson that the Scandinavian experience has for the United States is that the focus of
democratic deliberation should be the legislature.” ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 234. But a
broader look at Europe tells us the Europeans also try to use the courts whenever they can. See also
infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
87. See Andreas Maurer, Federal Constitutional Court To Decide Whether to Issue a Temporary
Injunction Against Germany's New Lifetime Partnerships Law for Homosexual Couples, 2 GERMAN L.J.
(2001), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=42 (In 2004,
the Life Partnership Act (Revised) was passed in the Lower House of Parliament, increasing the
rights of registered life partners to include, inter alia, the possibility of adoption and simpler alimony
and divorce rules, but excluding the tax benefits gained through marriage.).
88. See German Top Court Boosts Gay Couples’ Pension Rights, EXPATICA.COM, Oct. 23, 2009,
http://www.expatica.com/de/news/german-news/German-top-court-boosts-gay-couples_pension-rights-_57500.html; David Levitz, Germany's Gay Couples to Receive Equal Inheritance Tax
Rights, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5918626,00.html.
89. Following the enactment of the registered partnership, the center-right parties in Germany’s
Federal Constitutional Court challenged the Lifetime Partnership Act. The court held the Act
constitutional by a 5-3 majority. The main substantive argument against the law was that the Act
conflicts with the freedom to marriage guaranteed in Article 6 of the German Constitution. The
majority held that the freedom to marry is not affected by the Act, because the institution of lifetime
partnership does not pose an obstacle to those wishing to entering into marriage, as it deals
exclusively with same-sex couples. Marriage, according to the majority, is not defined in the
German Constitution but could be interpreted as a union between one woman and one man. It
seems, therefore, that this case creates an obstacle to future legislation attempting to legalize samesex marriage. Indeed, according to the dissenting opinion, Article 6 prevents the legislature from
extending its substantive protection to same-sex couples. See Russell Miller & Volker Röben,
Constitutional Court Upholds Lifetime Partnership Act, 3 GERMAN L.J. ¶ 8 (2002), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=176; see also Mathias Möschel,
Germany’s Life Partnerships: Separate and Unequal? 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 37, 39 (2009-2010) (describing
“some of the highly problematic assumptions and rhetorical and strategic moves used by German
judges to justify the unequal treatment of life partnerships and marriage.”).
90. Court Rules Germany Must Recognise Foreign Gay Marriages, LOCAL, Jun. 15, 2010,
http://www.thelocal.de/society/20100615-27871.html (“The court agreed with the view of the
authorities that he could not be registered as ‘married’ because a marriage under German law
requires different-sex couples”).
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Great Britain: Great Britain represents a comprehensive model for
registered partnerships. The Civil Partnership Act of 2004 provides same-sex
couples with rights and responsibilities identical to those offered by civil
marriage.91 Before this, there was no recognition of same-sex relationships in
Great Britain.92
In 2003, Susan Wilkinson and Celia Kitzinger were legally married in
Canada and then returned home to England. Great Britain did not accept their
marriage and recognized their relationship only as a civil partnership. In 2006,
Wilkinson and Kitzinger sought a declaration that their Canadian marriage be
considered a marriage in England.93 As it was not recognized, they asked for a
declaration of incompatibility with Section 4 of the Human Rights Act of 1998.
In refusing to grant the declaration, the House of Lords held that the United
Kingdom’s Parliament, when enacting the Civil Partnership Act, implicitly
expressed its wish not to allow marriage for same-sex couples. The court’s
strong defense of the Act’s benefits, which was not legally necessary for its
holding, was very conservative: “By withholding from same-sex partners the
actual title and status of marriage, the Government declined to alter the deeprooted and almost universal recognition of marriage as a relationship between a
man and a woman.”94 Considering the court’s rhetoric and the general
environment, it seems likely that it will not extend marriage rights to same-sex
couples in the near future.95

91. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33 (Eng.) (Civil partners are entitled to the same property
rights as married opposite-sex couples, and the same exemptions as married couples on inheritance
tax, social security, and pension benefits. The Act also grants individuals in civil partnerships the
ability to obtain parental responsibility for a partner’s child.).
92. See Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D. 130 (H.L.) [133] (appeal taken from England) (As
early as 1866, marriage was defined as the union of “one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all
others.”); Talbot v. Talbot, [1967] 111 Sol. J. 213 (A woman went through a marriage ceremony with a
person whom she believed was a man but who turned out to be a woman. The marriage was
annulled, and it was concluded that “there was plainly no marriage and [the court] pronounced a
decree nisi (of nullity) saying that the decree could be made absolute forthwith.”). Subsequently,
section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was amended to declare that marriage between two
people of the same sex is a cause to invalidate the marriage.
93. Wilkinson v. Kitzinger, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 2022, [75] (Eng.).
94. Id. ¶ 88.
95. Another indication of the unwillingness of the British legislature to open marriage to samesex couples is the position of the United Kingdom in the submission to the European Court of Justice
of a case involving an Austrian gay couple who registered as civil partners in England. The couple
brought a claim against the Austrian government for their refusal to recognize their status as civil
partners in Austria. The United Kingdom submitted to the court an opinion arguing that the
Austrian government should not recognize the couple’s status. Why should the United Kingdom
argue against recognition of a status that it conferred? There is only one reasonable explanation.
The United Kingdom was probably concerned that if the European Court of Justice ruled that
Austria has a duty to recognize marital status conferred by another country, a similar argument
could be made that the United Kingdom has a duty to recognize same-sex marriages from other EU
countries. Afua Hirsch, UK Challenged the Right to Civil Partnerships of Gay Couples Abroad,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/dec/09/civil-partnership-rightsaustria-uk.
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For a portion of the LGB community in the United Kingdom, civil
partnership may be more desirable than marriage.96 Though I will discuss this
in greater detail infra, it is important to note that Stonewall, one of Britain’s
bigger and important LGB organizations, pushed for the enactment of civil
partnerships instead of civil marriage because they thought it was a better
option for LGB people.97 However, straight and LGB activists recently initiated
the Equal Love Campaign, in which they aim to challenge in the ECHR the ban
on same-sex marriage and, simultaneously, dispute the ban forbidding oppositesex couples from registering as civil partners.98
The Netherlands: In 1998, the Netherlands introduced a legal scheme
making registered partnerships an option available to both same- and oppositesex couples. In 2001, it became the first country in the world to open up the
institution of civil marriage to same-sex couples.99 Following the next step of the
theory of small change, parental rights laws were amended to grant same-sex
couples equal parental rights. In 2005, the parliament eliminated the law
disallowing same-sex couples from adopting children from abroad, thus
repealing the only discriminatory provision that remained in its laws.100
According to Waaldijk, the fact that it was the first nation to offer same-sex
marriage is can be attributed to the incremental process, the secular nature of the
country, and a long tradition of tolerance toward the LGB community.101
Southern Europe: Litigation for the recognition of same-sex marriage was
unsuccessful in Spain during the 1990s.102 By 2005 nearly all the autonomous
regions in the country had some form of registered partnership. However,
when the socialist party proposed same-sex marriage legislation, massive
96. Sir Elton John, for example, said recently, “I don't want to be married…David and I are not
married. Let’s get that right. We have a civil partnership. What is wrong with Proposition 8 is that
they went for marriage. Marriage is going to put a lot of people off. It's the word marriage.” He
believes that same-sex couples should be happy with a civil partnership, as it gives them the same
legal rights and protection as opposite-sex couples. “I'm very happy with a civil partnership. If gay
people want to get married, or get together, they should have a civil partnership.” Tim Walker, Sir
Elton John: I Would Not Be Anyone's Wife, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 14, 2008.
97. See Beccy Shipman & Carol Smart, “It’s Made a Huge Difference”: Recognition, Rights and the
Personal Significance of Civil Partnership, 12 SOC. RES. ONLINE ¶ 2.5 (2007), http://
www.socresonline.org.uk/12/1/shipman.html (“Although Stonewall used the language of equal
rights, they did not argue for simply expanding the institution of marriage to include homosexuals
(as has happened in Canada). Instead they argued that Civil Partnership was preferable to marriage
because it should be seen as a twenty-first century means of recognising modern relationships and
that this was preferable to attempting to radicalise the traditional notion of marriage.”).
98. Adam Gabbatt, European Court Urged to End UK Marriage “Apartheid,” GUARDIAN, Dec. 19,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/dec/19/european-court-marriage-civil2010,
partnerships.
99. See Waaldijk, supra note 28, at 572 (The Dutch parliament made this change by amending
Article 30 of Book 1 of the Dutch civil code to provide: “A marriage can be contracted by two
persons of different sex or of the same sex.”).
100. See id. at 575 (There is concern that countries will prohibit international adoption to
countries where children might be given to same-sex couples. This concern was minimized after
South Africa, one of the countries from which children commonly arrive, announced that it would
allow same-sex marriage.).
101. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 474.
102. See José Ignacio Pichardo Galán, Same-Sex Couples in Spain: Historical, Contextual and Symbolic
Factors, in CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 159, 160-62.
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opposition arose, including a huge demonstration of half a million people
against the legislation.103 Nevertheless, the legislation passed in 2005, and Spain
became the third country in the world to recognize same-sex marriage.
Portugal presents a similar story. In 2001, the Portuguese legislature
introduced a weak registered partnership scheme for same-sex couples living
together for more than two years as a “de facto” union.104 Recently, however,
the Portuguese parliament passed a bill to legalize same-sex marriage; it became
effective in June 2010.105 Therefore, it seems that both Spain and Portugal
conform to the incremental pattern.
Italy, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus are the least developed with regards to
same-sex marriage.106 None of these countries offer recognition of any kind for
same-sex couples. Article 29 of the Italian Constitution of 1948 stipulates, “The
Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural society based on
marriage.” This was invoked as a strong argument against opening marriage to
same-sex couples, and most scholars interpret this Article as preventing the
legalization of same-sex marriage.107 Although a few scholars have suggested
different interpretations, this is still the common belief.108 The discussion has
been on the national agenda for years, and though a small number of proposals
have been discussed by the legislature, they have not led to significant results.
Serious attempts by the Government of Romano Prodi in 2007 to introduce
legislation failed after members of the governing coalition threatened division in
opposition to the proposals. The main proposal called for a patto civile di
solidarietà (PaCS), but it offered even fewer rights than its French counterpart.109
103. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 84-85.
104. See Rosa Martins, Same-Sex Partnerships in Portugal: From De Facto to De Jure?, 4 UTRECHT L.
REV., no. 2, June 2008 at 194, 195, http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/
view/74/74 (The institution of registered partnerships denied same-sex partners many financial,
property, and prenatal rights granted to married couples.).
105. See Portugal Allows Same-Sex Marriage, ABC NEWS, May 18, 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/
news/stories/2010/05/18/2903000.htm.
106. See Themis Katsagiannis, Parliament Denies Recognition of Same Sex Partners, ILGA EUR., Aug.
4, 2009, available at http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/guide/country_by_country/greece/
Parliament-denies-recognition-of-same-sex-partners (In Greece, the institution of cohabitation
recently received recognition. The legislature conferred a few rights upon unmarried couples, but
explicitly included only opposite-sex couples. A bill to confer a limited set of rights on same-sex
partners was rejected by the parliament.); Anthee Carassava, Same-Sex Marriages Performed in Greece,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/world/ europe/04greece.html (A
minor scandal occurred when the mayor of a small island married a few same-sex couples.); David
Frueh, Greece Justice Minister Denounces First Same-Sex Marriages, JURIST, June 4, 2008, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/06/greece-justice-minister-denounces-first.php
(The
Greek Justice Minister quickly declared the marriages “non-existent.”); Kees Waaldijk, supra note 21,
at 384 (Malta does not recognize same-sex partnerships at all.).
107. See Gioia Scappucci, Italy Walking a Tightrope Between Stockholm and the Vatican: Will Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships Ever Occur?, in LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 519, 529-30.
108. Matteo Bonini Baraldi, Family vs. Solidarity: Recent Epiphanies of the Italian Reductionist
Anomaly in the Debate on De Facto Couples, 4 UTRECHT L. REV., no. 2, June 2008 at 175,
http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/view/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%3
A10-1-101092/73.
109. The Italian proposal also allowed partnership registration for family members other than
first-degree relatives. For example, cousins would be able to register as partners and achieve the
same rights as same-sex couples.
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Hence, it is very unlikely that Italy will move toward the legalization of samesex marriage anytime soon.110
Eastern Europe: Eastern European countries are the newest members of the
European Union and generally lag behind their European Union counterparts
with regard to same-sex marriage. Slovenia, Croatia, and Montenegro all
decriminalized homosexual conduct in 1976, significantly earlier than their
neighbors Serbia and Kosovo (1994), Macedonia (1997), and Bosnia and
Herzegovina (1998). In Slovenia, a 2006 law provides a weak level of registered
partnership;111 though it lacks many provisions concerning parental rights and
financial benefits.112 Recently, however, a bill legalizing same-sex marriage and
permitting same-sex couples to adopt passed in the lower house of parliament
and is now pending in the Labour, Family and Social Affairs Committee.113
Based on the necessary steps of the theory of small change, Merin
suggested in 2002 that the Czech Republic belongs to a group that is “not likely
to recognize same-sex couples anytime soon.”114 Nevertheless, the Czech
Republic introduced a registered partnership scheme in 2006 and an amendment
to grant greater rights to registered partners in June 2008, effectively making
registered partners closer in legal status to married couples.115
In 1995, the Hungarian Constitutional Court held that marriage is restricted
to opposite-sex couples, though it took a more liberal approach in recognizing
the cohabitation rights of same-sex couples. After years of attempts to legislate
registered partnerships in Hungary, the parliament adopted such a scheme for

110. The Italian court system has also proven to be ineffective, as illustrated by the case of a
lesbian couple caught up in a controversy over a child raised by both women. After the couple
ended their relationship, the nonbiological mother asked the court for custody. The court held that,
as they were not a family according to the law, she lacked standing to resolve the dispute. Baraldi,
supra note 108, at 192 (“The court could only conclude that, according to current Italian law, only
(biological or adoptive) parents have standing in court for such requests. Therefore, it had to turn
down the application for contact on grounds of lack of standing.”).
111. Roman Kuhar, The Impracticability of Active Citizenship Beyond the Closet in Slovenia, in THE
GAYS’ AND LESBIANS’ RIGHTS IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 147, 151-52 (Anne Weyembergh &
Sinziana Carstocea eds., 2006).
112. See Matej Avbelj & Arne Marjan Mavčič, Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on
Grounds of Sexual Orientation – Slovenia, EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS – FRA
5 (Feb. 2008), available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-hdgso-NR_SI.pdf
(discussing the lack of provisions concerning children and other shortcomings of the Slovenian law).
113. Family Law Debate Remains Stuck at Beginning, SLOVENIA TISKOVNA ANGENCIJA, May 5, 2010,
http://www.sta.si/en/vest.php?s=a&id=1509509; Slovenia First Ex-Communist Country with Gay
Marriage?, GAY MARRIAGE BLOG (Sept. 8, 2010, 9:48 AM), http://www.thegaymarriageblog.com/
2010/09/slovenia-to-be-first-ex-communist-country-with-gay-marriage;
The Status of Same-Sex
Marriage World-Wide, UNITED FAMS. INT’L BLOG (Dec. 9, 2009, 12:03 PM) http://
unitedfamiliesinternational.wordpress.com/2009/12/09/the-status-of-same-sex-marriage-worldwide/.
114. MERIN, supra note 5, at 331.
115. See ILGA Eur. & Global Rights, The Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights in
the Czech Republic: Submission to the Human Rights Council for the Universal Periodic Review (1st Session),
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW (July 2007), http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session1/
CZ/ILGA_CZE_UPR_S1_2008_InternationalLesbianandGayAssociation_uprsubmission.pdf.

Aloni_proof_022311

126 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/23/2011 12:48:26 PM

Volume 18:105 2010

both same-sex and opposite-sex couples in December 2007.116 On December 23,
2008, however, the Constitutional Court struck down the law, holding that the
law allowing opposite-sex couples to enter into registered partnerships
diminished the value of constitutionally guaranteed heterosexual marriage.117
The Hungarian parliament thus passed the bill again, this time allowing
registered partnerships for same-sex couples only.
In Poland, three attempts to legislate registered partnership have all been
rejected, and it seems highly unlikely that the current government will support
such a bill.118 In Romania, the Senate voted in 2008 to amend the Family Code to
define marriage as the union between a man and a woman.119 There is strong
resistance to same-sex partner registration in the Baltic States of Estonia,
Lithuania, and Latvia120 and in Latvia there is a constitutional ban on same-sex
marriage.121
In sum, this survey of the legal situation in Europe offers a few lessons.
First, some countries, mainly in Scandinavia, have followed the pattern
suggested by the theory of small change. Second, it is not yet clear that samesex marriage in Europe is inevitable or even that it is likely to be the final stage
in some countries. Whether the eastern and southern countries will ever open
marriage to same-sex couples is a question of great importance. It is also not
clear whether the other members of the European Union will permit same-sex
marriage in the future or will stay with civil unions. Indeed, the most influential
legal systems in Europe seem determined to offer legal recognition only through
civil unions and do not appear inclined to allow same-sex marriage in the near
future. I do not, however, argue that these countries will never offer same-sex
marriage. For example, it is likely that Denmark will, at some point, expand the
institution of marriage to include same-sex couples.122 But until it does,
describing the effect of civil unions in Belgium and the Netherlands as the
general rule while disregarding the effect that civil unions have had in other
countries such as Denmark paints an inaccurate picture. Clearly, the European
Union will soon require member states to recognize same-sex partnerships, but

116. See Orsolya Szeibert-Erdős, Same-Sex Partners in Hungary: Cohabitation and Registered
Partnership, 4 UTRECHT L. REV., no. 2, June 2008, at 212, 212, http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/
index.php/ulr/article/view/75/75.
117. See Ellen M. Rice, Hungarian Court Strikes Down Heterosexual and Same-Sex Civil Unions Over
Damage to the Family, LIFESITENEWS.COM, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2008/dec/
08121605.html.
118. See Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships Within the
European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949, 1960 (2008).
119. Romania: Discriminatory Partnership and Adoption Provisions in New Civil Code, INT’L GAY &
LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (July 30, 2009), http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/
takeaction/resourcecenter/953.html.
120. See Boele-Woelki, supra note 118.
121. See Merle Haruoja et al., Thematic Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of
Sexual Orientation (Estonia), EDZ ARCHIDOK (Feb. 2008), http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/
daten/edz-b/ebr/08/FRA-hdgso-NR_EE.pdf.
122. See Associated Press, Europe Split on Gay Marriage, GAY NEWS FROM 365GAY.COM (Dec. 18,
2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/20080129053504/http://www.365gay.com/Newscon06/12/121806euPoll
.htm (In a poll conducted by the European Union, sixty-nine percent of Denmark’s population
supported same-sex marriage, placing Denmark third, behind Sweden and the Netherlands.).
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it will likely allow individual states to decide whether to offer the option of
marriage or unions.123 Recently the European Court of Human Rights held, in a
4-3 decision, that the member states of the European Council have no obligation
to allow same-sex marriage.124 Third, this study suggests that civil unions
should not be understood as necessarily catalyzing the legalization of same-sex
marriage, as civil unions can actually often impede it. Finally, it is clear that in
many countries the courts have been active in granting LGB individuals equal
rights, and in many other countries the intervention of the courts has been
requested by LGB people. Contrary to the common belief concerning the
European courts’ lack of involvement in the recognition of same-sex couples,
this study shows that in most European countries, LGB people have petitioned
both the national courts and the European Court of Human Rights, and that
some of these courts have been very active in denying or granting same-sex
couples the right to marry.
B. Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in the United States
Generally speaking, while some states, such as Vermont125 and
Connecticut,126 have followed the theory of small change, other states have
123. The European Union Parliament has often demonstrated its commitment to LGB rights
generally and to legal recognition of same-sex partnerships specifically. In 2003 it delivered the
following resolution, calling on “Member States to abolish all forms of discrimination—whether
legislative or de facto—which are still suffered by homosexuals, in particular as regards the right to
marry and adopt children.” European Parliament Resolution on the Situation as Regards
Fundamental Rights in the European Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. (2002/2013(INI)) ¶ 77 (2002).
Recently, the European Parliament has adopted a resolution calling for all EU member states to
engage in “the mutual recognition of the effects of civil status documents.” EUR. PARL. DOC.
(2010/2080(INI)) (2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang
=en&procnum=INI/2010/2080. Eskridge and Spedale estimate that “[a]t some point, the European
Union will impose some uniform requirement upon its member states.” ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra
note 7, at 241. A uniform requirement, however, does not necessarily mean marriage, but more
likely means a demand to offer same-sex couples the same rights as opposite-sex couples.
124. Case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ echr/en/
header/press/multimedia/webcasts+of+public+hearings/webcasts2010.htm (follow “Judgment of
24/06/10” hyperlink).
125. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (requiring statutory benefits for same-sex
couples). At the time of the Baker decision, Vermont had already decriminalized sodomy laws and
introduced antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 891 (Dooley, J. concurring). Then in 1999, the Vermont
Supreme Court ruled, based on the state constitution, that same-sex couples must be granted rights
and privileges equal to those granted to married opposite-sex couples. Id. at 867. While the final
implementation was left to the state legislature, the justices declared that “Whatever system is
chosen . . . must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford all Vermonters the common
benefit, protection, and security of the law.” Id. The state legislature then embraced the idea of civil
unions and recently voted to allow marriage between members of the same sex. 2009 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 3.
126. Connecticut, the second jurisdiction in the United States to legalize same-sex marriage, has
followed the stages of the theory of small change, but it is unclear whether the establishment of civil
unions had any effect on this decision. In 2004, eight couples submitted a lawsuit to the Connecticut
trial court, asserting that denying same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. At the time, Connecticut
offered only a domestic partnership registry. While the action was pending in the trial court, the
legislature passed a civil union law, which established the right of same-sex partners to enter into
civil unions and conferred on them all the rights and privileges that are granted to spouses in a
marriage. The civil union did not satisfy the plaintiffs and they sustained the claim, asserting that
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followed very different paths. In fact, many states have legalized same-sex
marriage without ever passing civil unions or following the path proscribed by
Waaldjik.127
Hawaii is a good example of the problems associated with the theory of
small change and the incremental approach. In the 1993 case of Baehr v. Lewin,128
the Hawaiian Supreme Court became the first in the United States to recognize
that the exclusion of same-sex marriage amounts to discrimination on the basis
of sex.129 The Hawaiian Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court to
examine whether the state had a compelling reason to discriminate against
same-sex couples. By the time the case returned to the Hawaiian Supreme
Court, Hawaiian voters had, by an overwhelming majority of 69 percent, ratified
a constitutional amendment in a state referendum giving the Hawaiian
legislature the authority to amend the marriage law to apply only to oppositesex couples.130 Following the court’s decision, Hawaii enacted the Reciprocal
Beneficiaries Act, which provides a limited set of rights to same-sex couples.131
Recently, the Hawaiian State House approved a bill offering civil unions to
same-sex couples.132 The bill, however, failed in Senate committee.133 A second
attempt to enact civil unions succeeded but was ultimately vetoed by the
the civil union law and its prohibition against same-sex marriage did not pass constitutional muster.
Demian, Civil Unions: The Connecticut Approach, PARTNERS TASK FORCE (Nov. 21, 2009),
http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-conn.html (discouraging couples from entering into civil
unions); Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 101-02 (Conn. 2006). Indeed, at the end of July 2006, only
1072 civil unions were registered, and it does not seem that it has had a great influence on society in
Connecticut. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, asserting that “the effect of [the civil union
law] has been to create an identical set of legal rights in Connecticut for same-sex couples and
opposite-sex couples.” Id. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled by a 4-3 majority that
denying same-sex couples the right to marry was against the equality and liberty rules in the
Connecticut Constitution. Connecticut, therefore, did follow the classic stages. It is not clear,
however, that civil unions actually contributed to the incremental process toward same-sex marriage.
The civil unions were legislated while a court challenge was pending and, therefore, could not really
have an effect on the process. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008).
127. A total of fifteen states had passed mini-DOMAs by the end of 1996, and at the time of this
writing, thirty states have constitutional provisions limiting recognition of same-sex relationships,
and several other states have amended their marriage laws for the same purpose. See, e.g., DOMA
WATCH, http://www.domawatch.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (“There are 30 states that have
constitutional amendments protecting traditional marriage, including the three states (Arizona,
California, and Florida) that passed constitutional amendments in November 2008.”).
128. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 74 (Haw. 1993), reh’g granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993), aff’d sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
129. See id. at 561-72 (The Court did not decide that withholding marriage from same-sex couples
is unconstitutional, but rather that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples is prima facie sex
discrimination requiring justification and therefore remanded the case to a lower court to examine
whether the state could provide a compelling rationale.); Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *15
(Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996) (In 1996, on remand, a Hawaiian state circuit court found that the State had not
provided sufficient justification.).
130. MERIN, supra note 5, at 221-22.
131. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (1997) (providing that any two single adults who cannot get
married have access to some state rights benefits, such as inheritance rights, the right to sue for
wrongful death, and health and pension benefits for the partners of state employees).
132. H.B. 444, 25th Leg. (Haw. 2009).
133. Mark Niesse, Committee Deadlocks on Hawaii Same-Sex Unions Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 28,
2009, http://www.webcitation.org/5ewQDxNaq.
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governor.134 It took Hawaii twelve years to begin discussing replacing the
reciprocal beneficiaries scheme with civil unions, and they have not yet
succeeded in doing so. A review of the State House’s discussion while the bill
was being argued makes clear that a majority of the members of the legislature,
as well as proponents of civil unions in the general public, were primarily
concerned with equalizing the day-to-day rights of same-sex couples but
showed no clear desire to enhance their official status.135 Moreover, Hawaiian
couples recently filed a lawsuit “seeking a status like civil unions” in order to
attain rights and benefits equal to those granted to opposite sex-couples.136 The
case of Hawaii thus shows how registered partnership schemes can impede the
legalization of same-sex marriage by focusing efforts on the struggle for civil
unions and putting same-sex marriage on the backburner. Incrementalism in
Hawaii’s case has been too slow and too gradual.
While Vermont was the first state to enact civil unions, Massachusetts was
the first to recognize same-sex marriage.137 Massachusetts is a prime example of
why an incrementalist process is not always necessary. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held in a 4-3 majority that the Massachusetts
Constitution prohibits the state from denying same-sex couples the right to
marry.138 When faced with the question of whether offering civil unions rather
than marriage is constitutional, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
replied sharply that:
Segregating same-sex unions from opposite-sex unions cannot possibly be held
rationally to advance or “preserve” what we stated in Goodridge were the
Commonwealth’s legitimate interests in procreation, child rearing, and the
conservation of resources . . . . Because the proposed law by its express terms
forbids same-sex couples entry into civil marriage, it continues to relegate samesex couples to a different status.139

The case of Massachusetts demonstrates that legal recognition of same-sex
marriage can be achieved in the absence of the incremental approach. Eskridge
clarifies that Massachusetts “had deregulated sodomy and adopted sweeping
antidiscrimination and hate crime laws protecting LGBT people, but each
[Massachusetts and Vermont] had also adopted statewide domestic partnership
regimes for state employees.”140
I believe Eskridge overestimates the progress demonstrated in
Massachusetts before the state’s Supreme Court decision.
Indeed,
134. Associated Press, Hawaii: Governor Vetoes Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2010),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E5DC1230F934A35754C0A9669D8B63&ref=s
ame_sex_marriage.
135. Testimony on H.B. 444, 25th Leg. (Haw. 2009), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/
session2009/Testimony/HB444_TESTIMONY_JUD_02-05-09_.pdf.
136. Young v. Lingle, LAMBDA LEGAL (July 29, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/
cases/young-v-lingle.html.
137. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (2003) (“We declare that barring
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”).
138. Id.
139. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004).
140. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 7, at 35-36 (emphasis added).
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Massachusetts decriminalized sodomy laws and adopted antidiscrimination
laws protecting LGB people in 1998,141 but it only offered an extremely limited
domestic partnership registry. An executive order signed by Governor William
Weld in 1993 provided limited rights for a limited number of high-level
employees: it allowed employees in same-sex relationships to register their
partners for non-medical benefits and bereavement purposes only.142 Domestic
partnership schemes, however, usually provide substantial rights, including
such rights as to remain in a rent-controlled apartment after the domestic
partner and leaseholder dies, to visit the domestic partner in a city hospital, and
(in the case of the partners of city employees) to access subsidized health
insurance.143
Moreover, while several cities and towns in Massachusetts have offered a
more expansive recognition of domestic partnership, including medical benefits,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in 1999 that the City of
Boston did not have the power to expand the reach of the state insurance laws
by including domestic partners in the group health system.144 Although not
directly at issue in the case, the benefits provided to domestic partners and their
dependents by nearby towns and cities were called into question by the court’s
ruling.145
Therefore, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its
decision, it had passed only the first two steps proposed by the theory of small
change, i.e., decriminalizing sodomy and enacting antidiscrimination laws.146
There was only minimal legal recognition of same-sex relationships, and
Massachusetts did not offer the option of civil unions or expansive domestic
partnership registration when the court decision was handed down. As such,
Massachusetts is an exception to Merin’s theory that the stage of civil unions
always precedes legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
This is made even clearer by the case of Iowa, a state that never had any
civil union or domestic partnership scheme prior to the Iowa Supreme Court
ruling that struck down the ban on same-sex marriage.147 In fact, sexual
orientation was added to the antidiscrimination law in 2007, only two years
prior to the aforementioned court ruling. Thus, Iowa did not go through any
sort of incremental process or the “necessary progress” described by the theory
of small change.

141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 3(6) (July 1, 2003).
142. Mass. Exec. Order No. 340 (Nov. 19, 1993).
143. See N.Y. Executive Order No. 33, Establishing a State Policy Against Discrimination of the Basis
of Sexual Orientation and Reviving a Task Force to Address Individuals’ Rights to Benefit of Government
Services and Opportunity for Government Service Regardless of Sexual Orientation, 9 NYCRR 5.33 (1996).
144. See Connors v. City of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335, 342 (Mass. 1999) (revoking an Executive
Order issued by Boston’s mayor which granted health insurance benefits to registered domestic
partners of city employees).
145. See Jennifer L. Levi, Massachusetts’ Domestic Partnership Challenge: Hope for a Better Future, 9
LAW & SEXUALITY 137, 149 (1999-2000).
146. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1004 (Mass. 2003).
147. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009).
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California, in contrast to other states, clearly followed incremental
process.148 As early as 1997, the County of San Francisco enacted the Equal
Benefits Ordinance, the first ordinance in the United States requiring certain
private actors to recognize same-sex relationships.149 Other jurisdictions, such as
Berkeley and Los Angeles, followed. In 1999, California was the first state to
enact a domestic partnership registry.150 In 2000, however, 61 percent of voters
voted to enact a ballot initiative known as Proposition 22, adding a section to the
California Family Code formally defining marriage as a union between a man
and a woman.151 In October 2001, California expanded the rights of same-sex
couples under its domestic partnership law, and in 2003, the state enacted an
even more substantial extension.152 This process has steadily continued ever
since, with at least one bill extending greater rights to same-sex couples passing
every year.
In 2004, in the wake of the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision,153 San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom ordered that county marriage licenses be
issued “on a non-discriminatory basis, without regard to gender or sexual
orientation.”154 This caused substantial controversy, and the Supreme Court of
California subsequently voided the marriages, ruling unanimously that the
mayor had overstepped his authority by issuing licenses to same-sex couples.155
Following this case, LGB organizations challenged the constitutionality of the
marriage law. 156 In September 2005, while the California court heard the case,
the California legislature approved a bill legalizing same-sex marriage, making
it the first state in the nation to approve a same-sex marriage bill without court
intervention. Unfortunately, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the
bill.157
In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution. While the court was still
considering the case, opponents of same-sex marriage brought forth a ballot
initiative proposing an amendment to California’s constitution: “Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” This
proposal, commonly known as Proposition 8, was accepted in the 2008 election
by 52.3 percent of the vote. The validation of the amendment was almost
immediately challenged in the California Supreme Court, which upheld the
amendment but also validated the marriages of the almost 30,000 same-sex

148. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 115 (stating that California was “the only state with
comparable protection for lesbians and gay men.”).
149. MERIN, supra note 5, at 202.
150. Id.
151. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
152. Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2586 (West
2005).
153. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1003-04 (Mass. 2003).
154. Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004).
155. Id.
156. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384.
157. Nancy Vogel & Jordan Rau, Gov. Vetoes Same-Sex Marriage Bill, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005,
http://www.latimes.com/la-me-timelinegaymarriage-2005sep30,0,1040616.story.
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couples who had already married.158 More recently, however, the Northern
District of California overturned Proposition 8, ruling that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.159 The case is
currently under appeal.160
A few explanations were given for the victory of Proposition 8. One of the
popular explanations was that the candidacy of Barack Obama affected the
results. Those in support of this claim argue that African American and Latino
voters, who traditionally oppose same-sex marriage, showed up at the polls in
great numbers in support of President Obama and, while there, voted for
Proposition 8.161 This belief, however, cannot fully account for the passage of
Proposition 8. To be sure, while 70 percent of California’s African American
voters did vote yes on Proposition 8,162 a study shows that the initiative would
still have passed, albeit barely, even if African American and Latin voters had
shown up in the same numbers as they had for the 2004 elections.163 Others
suggest that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ donation of
approximately twenty million dollars in support of the amendment assisted the
passage of the proposition.164 Still others blame gay rights organizations for
failing to effectively publicize the lack of rights experienced by LGB couples.165
Whatever the reason, the victory of Proposition 8 led to the realization that
there are important and unpredictable factors influencing the path to legal
recognition of same-sex marriage. These factors have significant influence on
the ultimate acceptance of same-sex marriage—perhaps as much as or more
than the incremental process. The case of California demonstrates the
aforementioned concept of the butterfly effect.166 When it comes to same-sex

158. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009).
159. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 264 F.R.D. 576, 584 (N.D.Cal. 2009).
160. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (ordering the district
court’s judgment stayed pending appeal).
161. See Jesse McKinley, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Is Tied to Obama Factor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/us/politics/21gay.html.
162. See Hendrik Hertzberg, Eight Is Enough, NEW YORKER, Dec. 1, 2008, http://
www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2008/12/01/081201taco_talk_hertzberg.
163. Marisa Abrajano, Are Blacks and Latinos Responsible for the Passage of Proposition 8? Analyzing
Voter Attitudes on California’s Proposal to Ban Same-Sex Marriage in 2008, 63 POL. RES. Q. 922, 929 (2010)
(“[E]ven if turnout rates among these two groups remained at the same levels as they did in the 2004
presidential race, Proposition 8 still would have garnered a majority of support from California’s
voters. Nonetheless, given their large share of the state’s eligible voting population (31 percent),
black and Latino voters played an important role in the passage of Proposition 8.”).
164. Cf. Mark Schoofs, Mormons Boost Antigay Marriage Effort, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122186063716658279.html.
165. See Matthew Coles, Prop 8: Let’s Not Make the Same Mistake Next Time, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-coles/prop-8-lets-not-make-the_b_170271
.html.
166. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s “black swan” theory offers a different way of looking at the often
unpredictable nature of same-sex marriage. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE
IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2d ed. 2010). According to this theory, a black swan is an
historical event, an outlier, that comes as a surprise to the observer, has consequences on human
lives, and is explained retrospectively. Id. at xxi-xxiii. Such events include the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks; World War I; and the meteoric success of a book. One interesting observation made
by Taleb is that a black swan event is often analyzed and rationalized in the aftermath of the event,
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marriage, it is hard to foresee what seemingly small factors will have great
influence on the final outcome. 167 California also provides striking proof of the
fact that when it comes to marriage, change is never a small matter.
Maryland offers a more complicated picture regarding same-sex marriage,
though this picture demonstrates the point that there are many paths leading to
legalization of same-sex marriage. Maryland passed through the first two stages
of the theory of small change168 and came close to arriving at the final stage of
leading people to assume that it should have been possible to predict the event. That was the case
with the terrorist attacks: people looked back and argued that it should have been possible to
prevent it, that the data needed to prevent the event were there. But according to Taleb, such an
event can be “predicted” only in retrospect, because people’s minds are not trained to deal with
black swans. Human nature makes people think in hindsight of an event that it could have been
predicted beforehand. Taleb explains that “black swan” is an objective issue and that it is
appropriate to deal with it with empirical skepticism—on the one hand by using data, and on the
other hand by remembering that there are many things beyond our knowledge that could affect our
conclusions. Id. at 145-57. That is why, according to Taleb, people should be cautious about
interpreting scientific theories that give good explanations for events that have already transpired,
because in fact they lead us to fail to consider factors of which we are not aware. They provide us
with the illusion of knowledge and inflated confidence, thus catalyzing the next black swan. Id. at
137-45. Applying this idea to the predictability of same-sex marriage demonstrates that LGB
organizations should avoid assuming that everything—the outcome of a court case or a lobbying
effort, for example—can be known in advance. A case like Perry v. Schwarzenegger, which challenged
the ban on same-sex marriage in California, could, in the end, be determined by the composition of
the U.S. Supreme Court, sudden changes to which are not common. As stated by Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky, “The question is whether it’s too soon to risk that the court will reject it. We don’t
know who’s going to be on the court.” Andrew Harmon & Neal Broverman, Legal Expert Concerned
by Fed Prop 8 Case, THE ADVOCATE, May 27, 2009, http://www.advocate.com/Politics/
Marriage_Equality/Legal_Experts_Outraged_by_Federal_Prop__8_Case.
167. The case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger also “illustrated how the politics of litigation can operate
in unpredictable ways.” See Nan Hunter, Ninth Circuit Sends Prop 8 Standing Issue to California
Supreme Court, Jan. 4, 2011, HUNTER JUST. (Jan. 4, 2011, 10:50 PM),
http://hunterforjustice.typepad.com/hunter_of_justice/2011/01/ninth-circuit-sends-prop-8standing-issue-to-california-supreme-court.html. After the trial court concluded that the ban on
same-sex marriage in California violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution, California’s governor and attorney general refused to represent the appellants on
appeal. Therefore, the appellant may lack standing to appeal. To resolve the question of standing,
the Ninth Circuit decided to let the California Supreme Court determine whether proponents of
Prop 8 have standing to pursue the case. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 9633 (9th Cir. Jan. 4,
2011) (order certifying a question to the Supreme Court of California). Judge Reinhardt, a very
progressive judge, wrote a separate concurrence in which he criticized the lawyers on both sides for
choosing litigation strategies that created the standing problem. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL
9576 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (Reinhart, J. concurring). Specifically, he criticized Boise and Olson, the
lawyers representing the opponents of Prop 8, because “the issues concerning standing [would have
been] wholly avoidable in this case” if they had filed a lawsuit against a broader set of defendants.
Id. at *7. Judge Reinhardt is a pro-gay-rights judge as well as “a sharp critic of how procedural
issues like standing can erect obstacles to a court reaching the merits of a case.” Hunter, supra.
Hunter therefore concludes that “the politics of litigation can operate in unpredictable ways,” and
that “[t]he only thing certain about the impact of today’s rulings is that the progress of the case has
considerably slowed down.” Id. Hence, she suggests that the cases concerning the constitutionality
of DOMA at the federal level may arrive at the U.S. Supreme Court faster than this case. Id. In other
words, there are a number of different factors that affect the path to legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships—judges, litigation strategies, and other court cases that are adjudicated at the same
time.
168. Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL-1059, 1998 WL 965992, at *7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15,
1998) (holding that “the statute as it is written does not encompass consensual, non-commercial,
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legalizing same-sex marriage when the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed,
by a 4-3 split, the lower court’s decision that the ban on same-sex marriage
violated the state constitution.169
Even though the Maryland case may be construed as a failure for LGB
organizations, it stimulated the passage of domestic partnership legislation.170
Recently, Maryland’s Attorney General also announced that the state will
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.171 In several ways, the
situation in Maryland illustrates the complexity that can characterize the path to
same-sex marriage. First, the fact that three justices were ready to accept the
argument that banning same-sex marriage is unconstitutional indicates that it is
possible that Maryland could have moved directly to allowing same-sex
marriage, bypassing the other stages of the theory of small change. Second, at
least according to Merin, it is a fundamental mistake to go to court to ask for
marriage equality before all the preceding “necessary” steps have been
completed. Nevertheless, despite the failure to procure same-sex marriage
rights in Maryland, this court decision did stimulate the enactment of a domestic
partnership law.
New York presents a different path. Eskridge predicted that New York
would be one of the first states to “follow Vermont and create an institution for
same-sex couples.”172 Although his prediction was correct, it did so in a unique
way. In Hernandez v. Robles, New York’s Court of Appeals, the state’s highest
court, held that the ban on same-sex marriage is constitutional because there are
rational grounds on which the legislature could choose to restrict marriage to
opposite-sex couples.173 Recently, however, the Appellate Division, Fourth
Judicial Department of New York determined that this ruling does not preclude
recognition of same-sex marriages that are performed in Canada.174 Following
this decision, New York Governor David Paterson issued a memo to state
agencies calling on them to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states.175 As evidenced by the steps taken in New York, whose Senate recently
rejected a same-sex marriage bill,176 the path to same-sex marriage is usually
more complicated than that described by the theory of small change and
involves more than three stages.

heterosexual or homosexual activity between adults in private”); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20602 (LexisNexis 2009) (Maryland’s antidiscrimination law outlaws discrimination based on sexual
orientation).
169. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630 (Md. 2007).
170. 2008 Md. Laws 4597.
171. See Associated Press, Gay Marriage Makes Gain in Maryland, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24 2010, at A21,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/us/25marriage.html.
172. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 233.
173. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 2006).
174. Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
175. Martinez v. County of Monroe et al. (Seeking Recognition in New York for Valid Same-Sex
Marriages Performed Outside the State), NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http:// www.nyclu.org/
node/1088 (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
176. See Jeremy W. Peters, New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/nyregion/03marriage.html.
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There are many other exceptions to this theory. Maine, for example,
enacted domestic partnership laws in 2004 but did not add sexual orientation as
a protected category to its antidiscrimination law until 2005.177 In New Jersey,
the legislature enacted a civil union scheme in 2006 after its Supreme Court
decision in Lewis v. Harris178 but recently voted down a same-sex marriage bill.179
A change in legal status is not likely to come soon, as Governor Chris Christie
opposes same-sex marriage.180 Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused
to hear a case challenging the constitutionality of offering only same-sex couples
the option of civil unions, which again shows that civil unions may not catalyze
progress but may actually impede it.181
In conclusion, the survey of the American legal situation shows some
similarities to the European one. It mainly demonstrates that the incremental
approach is not always the solution, and that there are a variety of factors that
affect the path to same-sex marriage. The theory of small change overlooks this
multitude of factors. A survey of the different patterns leading to legal
recognition of same-sex partnerships in Europe and the United States
demonstrates that the process described by the theory of small change is not
accurate and does not allow for the complexities inherent in the struggle to
achieve legalization of same-sex marriage. The landscape does not show that
legal recognition of same-sex marriage is inevitable. Many countries and states
seem to be reluctant to move beyond the stage of civil unions, while others have
constitutional bans prohibiting same-sex marriage. Furthermore, the courts of
some of these countries and states have gone so far as to interpret existing
constitutional provisions as prohibiting same-sex marriage.
Now that it has been demonstrated that the theory of small change is not
able to accurately predict the legalization of same-sex marriage, I will consider
whether Badgett’s method offers a better framework.

177. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (Supp. 2009). Moreover, the case of Maine also suggests
that the granting of marriage rights by the legislature does not make a state immune to the problems
associated with legalization of same-sex marriage by the court. The fact that the legislature grants
such rights does not preclude the possibility that those rights will be revoked by the people in a
referendum. In Maine, a same-sex marriage bill was approved by the legislature and signed into law
by the Governor in 2009. Nevertheless, opponents successfully petitioned for a referendum on the
issue, putting the new law on hold before it came into effect; the referendum was approved by 53
percent of voters, preventing the new law from ever going into effect. Abby Goodnough, A Setback
in Maine for Gay Marriage, but Medical Marijuana Law Expands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/us/politics/05maine.html?_r=1&scp=10&sq=maine+samesex+marriage&st=nyt.
178. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
179. See David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Senate Defeats Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010,
at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/nyregion/08trenton.html.
180. Id.
181. See Associated Press, New Jersey Supreme Court Declines Gay Marriage Case, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2010, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/nyregion/27jersey.html?ref
=same_sex_marriage.
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V. BADGETT’S EMPIRICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTING THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS
Badgett offers important criticism of Eskridge’s and Waaldijk’s theories.182
First, she argues that the theory of small change “impl[ies] the inevitability of
change,” while history actually suggests that progress in promoting tolerance
toward homosexuality has not been linear.183 In addition, the theory offers no
clear idea of how long each stage of the process should or will take. Second,
each stage fosters compromise—a consolation prize—rather than a concrete step
in the direction of change. She uses as an example Denmark, which in 1989
became the first country in the world to offer same-sex couples the option of
registered partnerships but has not yet achieved legal acceptance of same-sex
marriage.184 Finally, Badgett suggests that the theory of small change seems to
be a strategic plan for LGB organizations rather “than the inexorable process as
presented by Waaldijk and by Eskridge.”185 This notion of building on the
previous successes of the LGB movement fails to take into account many
important social, historical, and political factors not directly related to LGB
politics, such as changes in family structure and other social components. 186 She
posits that there are many factors affecting the acceptance of same-sex marriage.
Such factors include attitudes about homosexuality, the power of LGB
organizations, and the power of opponents of same-sex marriage. Additionally,
local ideological attitudes, such as liberalism, also play an important role.187
Badgett also asserts that the legal institution of marriage promotes efficiency at
the societal and family levels, and that this might affect the path to legal
recognition of same-sex partnerships in various ways. For example, if marriage
provides economic benefits, same-sex couples will have greater material
incentive to seek some form of recognition offering the same benefits.
Badgett suggests an alternative approach to understanding the expansion
of marriage rights to include same-sex couples based on “theoretical and
empirical work on institutions in economics, political science and sociology.”188
She argues that an examination of the European countries that provide some
form of recognition may shed light on the factors that explain why and where
legal change occurs. She suggests two different methods, which produce
consistent findings, for identifying these factors. The first method, based on a
quantitative regression analysis, stipulates that laws recognizing same-sex

182. In her article, “Predicting Partnership Rights,” supra note 8, Badgett refers only to Waaldijk’s
and Eskridge’s theories, while in her newest book, When Gay People Get Married: What Happens When
Societies Legalize Same-Sex Marriage she also refers to Merin’s theory. Badgett, supra note 8; M.V. LEE
BADGETT, WHEN GAY PEOPLE GET MARRIED: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SOCIETIES LEGALIZE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE 177 (2009).
183. Badgett, supra note 8, at 75.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. 75-76; BADGETT, supra note 182, 175-99 (using the same method to examine whether
change regarding recognition of same-sex relationships is too fast for the political climate or the
public’s will).
187. M.V. Lee Badgett, Variations on an Equitable Theme: Explaining International Same-Sex Partner
Recognition Laws, in CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 12, at 97.
188. Badgett, supra note 8, at 76.
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partnerships are found in countries with high rates of cohabiting opposite-sex
couples, more tolerant attitudes toward LGB people, higher social expenditures,
and greater visibility and density of LGB organizations. The second method, a
qualitative comparative analysis, shows that countries providing some kind of
legal recognition to same-sex couples tend to have a low level of religiosity, a
high rate of cohabiting opposite-sex couples, and high tolerance toward the LGB
community.189 Badgett uses the factors obtained through the second method,
however, because it finds two important factors—lower levels of religiosity and
the presence of a left-leaning government—to be statistically meaningful.190
Badgett utilizes these three factors (low level of religiosity, a high rate of
cohabiting opposite-sex couples, and high tolerance toward the LGB
community) to examine the current situation in the United States and determine
which states are most likely to legally recognize same-sex partnerships and
when. Essentially, Badgett’s research method assigns each state a score ranging
from zero to three.191 The higher the score, the more likely it is that a state will
recognize same-sex partnerships in the near future.192
The legalization of same-sex marriage in Iowa demonstrates the
inadequacy of Badgett’s theory, which assigns Iowa only two of a possible three
points. According to her theory, states with three points (such as Alaska,
Florida, Arizona, and Maryland) should have recognized same-sex partnerships
before Iowa. This was not the case, however. Similarly, two states that provide
full legal recognition to same-sex couples in the form of civil unions, such as
New Jersey193 and Illinois, received only two points, while some states that
received three points, such as Delaware and Florida, offer no recognition of
same-sex relationships.
Badgett’s argument exhibits five main shortcomings. First, her method
does not draw significantly different conclusions than those drawn by
Waaldjiik’s and Eskridge’s theories. Tellingly, she concludes that her method
“might be at least as relevant” as the theory of small change.194 Although one of
her main criticisms is that the incremental approach does not explain why some

189. Id. at 81.
190. Id. at 77-78.
191. Id. at 82.
192. States that received three points were Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. States that received two
points were Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming. States that received one point were Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia all
received zero points. Id. at 87-88 tbl. 2.
193. Badgett recognizes that her prediction regarding New Jersey was incorrect. Id. at 82 (“Like
the building-on-success models, the conditions-for-change framework predicts six out of seven
states with existing partnership laws, with New Jersey the exception this time because of its
relatively low rate of heterosexual cohabitation.”). The other examples I mention—Iowa and
Illinois—could not have been recognized as exceptions because these developments occurred after
Badgett’s research was published.
194. Id. at 84.
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countries have progressed faster than others,195 she too provides no clear
explanation in quantifiable terms. Rather, she simply lists factors that should be
added to the theory of small change196 but falls short in proving in any way that
these factors enhance the accuracy of the theory’s predictions.
Second, Badgett’s method does not distinguish between same-sex marriage
and registered partnerships. It is important to emphasize that Badgett, as the
title of her article (“Predicting Partnership Rights,” rather than “Predicting
Same-Sex Marriage”) suggests, attempts to predict only some kind of legal
recognition of same-sex couples (which might take the form of domestic
partnerships or civil unions)— not the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
She does not provide any predictions or explanations with regard to why one
state permits same-sex marriage while another allows only civil unions. The
theory’s inability to see marriage as a distinct legal category significantly lessens
the value of her argument. Indeed, as I shall discuss in greater detail infra,
marriage in the United States holds vastly more significance and is much more
complex than domestic partnership and civil unions. Therefore, Badgett’s
method cannot help explain, for instance, why Nevada (three points) has opted
for registered partnerships while Massachusetts (also three points) has legalized
same-sex marriage.
Third, Badgett attempts to predict the recognition of same-sex partnership
through empirical analysis, but this method has been shown to be inaccurate
and tends to oversimplify the debate. To begin with, the data Badgett uses is
imprecise. For instance, to examine levels of religiosity, she calculates “the
proportion of the state’s population who are adherents of evangelical
churches.”197 It is clear that basing estimations of the level of religiosity solely
on this type of data misses the mark. Are non-evangelical Christians and
members of other religions necessarily more likely to support the recognition of
same-sex relationships?
We may answer this question by looking at the state of Utah. According to
Badgett, the average percentage of evangelicals in the fifty states is 14.5
percent.198 In Utah, only 1.9 percent of citizens are members of an evangelical
church, less than in Massachusetts.199 However, Utah is known for being one of
the most religiously conservative states in the United States, with approximately
58 percent of its adult inhabitants claiming membership in the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, one of the most prominent opponents of same-sex
marriage.200 Under Badgett’s method, Utah actually received the highest score

195. Id. at 75 (“[T]he incrementalists offer no clear idea about how long each incremental step
should or will take.”).
196. Id. at 76-78.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 87; BADGETT, supra note 182, at 197.
199. Badgett, supra note 8, at 87; BADGETT, supra note 182, at 197.
200. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 99 (2008),
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf; see also Frank
Newport, Mormons Most Conservative Major Religious Group in U.S., GALLUP (Jan 11, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/125021/Mormons-Conservative-Major-Religious-Group.aspx
(“Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, or Mormons, are the most
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possible in this category, indicating a low level of religiousness that the State
does not possess in reality.201
Fourth, the factors suggested by Badgett can lead to consequences other
than legal recognition of same-sex couples. In France, for example, a high
tolerance toward homosexuality (one of the factors she mentions) has led to a
very weak LGB movement. The French LGB movement has not been “militant,
and [has] looked only for limited improvements in the situation.”202 The
relatively comfortable legal and social condition of the LGB community “partly
explains the lack of militant movements and the individualism of French
homosexuals.”203 And, as Badgett herself recognizes, the power and visibility of
the LGB movement is one of the important factors influencing the achievement
of the recognition of same-sex partnerships.204
Fifth, in applying the principles abstracted from the European experience,
Badgett disregards her own warning that “[t]ransferring political lessons and
experiences from one continent to another runs the risk of ignoring important
cultural or social differences between countries and continents.”205 For instance,
Badgett’s method does not account for the fact that the unique legal culture and
political philosophy of many European countries may affect these countries’
paths to the legalization of same-sex marriage.206 Such differences among
jurisdictions call into question the benefit such comparisons may provide. This
conservative major religious group in the country, with 59 [percent] identifying as conservative, 31
[percent] as moderate, and 8 [percent] as liberal.”).
201. Badgett, supra note 8, at 88 tbl. 2 (indicating that 1.9 percent of Utah’s population belongs to
an evangelical church). Similarly, in Rhode Island, a state that “does not recognize gay marriage,
partly owing to opposition from Roman Catholic church leaders in the most heavily Catholic state in
the country,” only 1.6 percent of the population is evangelical, which gives it the lowest level of
religiosity in the United States according to Badgett’s data. Rhode Island Lawmakers Back Same-Sex
Couples Rights to Plan Funerals, FOX NEWS, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/ politics/2010/01/
05/rhode-island-lawmakers-sex-couples-rights-plan-funerals#ixzz18tcPa3w9.
202. 2 FLORENCE TAMAGNE, A HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN EUROPE 267 (2004).
203. Id. at 305.
204. Badgett, supra note 8, at 77.
205. Id. at 85.
206. There are differences in the perceptions of the role of the court in countries governed by
civil law and the United States. For example, in France the courts have traditionally not been
political and it is therefore understood that they should not intervene in the work of legislatures. In
ancient France, law courts, known as the Parlements, often assumed a legislative role by protecting
royal decisions in order to defend the privileges of the social classes to which the judges belonged.
As a result, the French Revolution fostered a negative view of judges legislating from the bench.
This was reflected in the Napoleonic Code, which prohibited judges from passing judgments
exceeding the scope of the matter being judged. In theory, this is the reason that there is no case law
in France: judges were simply to decide the case they heard rather than try to establish precedents.
However, the courts still had to fill gaps in the laws. As a result, a large body of jurisprudence was
born, principally in the Conseil d’État. However, a judicial decision still cannot be based solely on a
previous decision. There is also a very limited form of judicial review in France: the Constitutional
Council can review legislation on constitutional grounds, but only in the period between passage of
a bill and signing by the President, and only on a referral by the authorized people (the President,
for example). Once the law is signed, it cannot be repealed by the court. The judges on the
Constitutional Council serve for only nine years. Charles de Gaulle explicitly rejected the American
idea of a Supreme Court, which he regarded as a form of “government by judges.” In a democracy,
he reportedly said, “the only supreme court is the people.” See JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 30-36 (1985); CATHERINE ELLIOTT ET AL., FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 135-40 (2d ed. 2006).
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critique is also relevant to the theory of small change’s failure to consider the
unique characteristics of each country and the way such attributes influence the
national debate over same-sex marriage. 207
For example, the way the French Republic defines citizenship affects the
country’s same-sex marriage debate perhaps more than any other factor. At the
heart of the French debate are the roles of republic itself and the important
concept of universalism—the oneness, the sameness, of all individuals.208
According to French universalism, that sameness is the basis for equality. That
equality is achieved by making one’s social, religious, sexual orientation, and
any other “origins” irrelevant in the public sphere.209 France insists on
assimilation to a singular culture: the embrace of shared language, history, and
political ideology. Under this concept, individual rights are secondary; the
republic comes first. Universalist ideals are evident in the unique nature of the
pacte civil de solidarité as an institution that is open to both same- and oppositesex couples. The American perception of individual rights and citizenship,
however, falls at the other end of the spectrum. Mary Ann Glendon argues that
Americans use “rights talk”—a tendency to convert social controversies into a
clash of rights that sets it apart from other Western democracies.210
In conclusion, while Badgett offers an important and valid critique, her
proposed method does not, and cannot, address a number of important political
and philosophical concepts and does not provide a reliable means of predicting
legal recognition of same-sex couples. It is clear that the social, cultural,
economic, philosophical, legal, and historical factors at play are so numerous
that such predictions are impossible. In the next Part, I offer a suggestion as to
why the theory of small change fails to accurately predict or explain the way
social change regarding same-sex marriage occurs.
VI. WHY A CHANGE TO MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES IS NEVER SMALL
The basic assumption of the theory of small change is that a correlation
exists between the first two stages and the ultimate legalization of same-sex
marriage. The theory assumes that recognition of same-sex marriage by a state
will necessarily follow a repeal of sodomy laws and the addition of sexual
orientation as a protected category to antidiscrimination laws.
As I have shown, the theory of small change does not conform to the
reality. The reason for this is that the three stages described by the theory are
materially and normatively different.
I argue that the two rationales
underpinning the theory of small change—i.e., (1) that each step improves the
207. An additional factor that might affect the struggle for same-sex marriage in the United
States, but is not relevant to the situation in Europe, is the repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy. This policy change will allow LGB people who serve in the army to argue that if they
fight for their country, they should have the right to enjoy all the rights and benefits associated with
marriage, including the right to marry. Such an argument can make the argument for the
legalization of marriage stronger and may induce recognition of same-sex partnerships.
208. ENDA MCCAFFREY, THE GAY REPUBLIC: SEXUALITY, CITIZENSHIP AND SUBVERSION IN FRANCE
15-20 (2005).
209. JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 11 (2008).
210. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1993).
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societal condition of LGB people and brings them closer to same-sex marriage
and (2) that the legalization of marriage is perceived as a small change once all
previous steps have been taken—are wrong. I contend that there is a substantial
difference between the right to not be prosecuted for engaging in homosexual
sex or the right to be free from discrimination based on sexual orientation and
the right to marry generally and the right to marry a person of the same sex
specifically. Societal acceptance of LGB rights does not necessarily mean
acceptance of same-sex marriage, because the rights at stake are often perceived
as so different that adoption of one of does not necessarily lead to the adoption
of others. In light of the importance of the institution and concept of marriage in
American society, any attempted change will not be perceived as “small,”
regardless of the events that may precede it. Perhaps in the Netherlands the
legalization of same-sex marriage was a small change, but this is not the case in
the United States, where marriage is oft perceived solely as a phenomenon of
opposite-sex partnership blessed by God and is undergirded by an historical
legacy based on societal beliefs.211 As Nancy Cott, an expert on the history of
marriage, argues:
From the founding of the United States to the present day, assumptions about
the importance of marriage and its appropriate form have been deeply
implanted in public policy, sprouting repeatedly as the nation took over the
continent and established terms for the inclusions and exclusion of new
citizens.212

The meaning of marriage in the Netherlands, one of the most secular
nations in the world, is very different from its meaning in the United States,
where marriage has great religious significance.213 “Marriage is like the
[S]phinx,” writes Cott, “a conspicuous and recognizable monument on the
landscape, full of secrets.”214 A change to such an institution in American
society cannot be perceived as small. Consider, for example, the recent
statement of American Evangelical Pastor Rick Warren:
I support full equal rights for everybody in America. I don’t believe we should
have unequal rights depending on particular lifestyles so I fully support equal
rights. . . [But] nowhere in the constitution can you find the “right” to claim that

211. See René König, Sociological Introduction, 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 39 (Aleck Chloros ed., 1974) (“[M]an’s ideas concerning the topic of love-and-marriage are
much more diverse and flexible than the structure of the family. While notions concerning love and
marriage often change with fashion, the family, as a universal human institution, is not so easily
changed.”).
212. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 1 (2000).
213. A recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center compared perceptions and rates of
marriage between the United States and Europe and found that “Americans have a unique
relationship with marriage. Compared with most other western nations, the U.S. has one of the
highest marriage rates as well as one of the highest divorce rates.” See The Decline of Marriage and Rise
of New Families, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 18, 2010), http://pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/thedecline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/2; see also SPECIAL EUROBARAOMETER: SOCIAL VALUES,
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/
ebs_225_report_en.pdf (indicating that only 34 percent of Dutch survey respondents said they
believe in God).
214. COTT, supra note 214, at 3.
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any loving relationship [is] identical to marriage. It’s just not there. I’m not
opposed to that [same-sex marriage] as much as I’m opposed to redefinition of a
5,000 year definition of marriage.215

Warren’s statement indicates a special resistance to opening the institution
of marriage to same-sex couples, even though he accepts that LGB people
deserve equal rights. Similarly, when deciding that sodomy laws targeting
adults engaging in consensual sex were unconstitutional, United States Supreme
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized that there is a difference between
granting the right to engage in homosexual sex and granting individuals the
right to marry a member of the same sex:
[The case] does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case
does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other,
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.216

Polls indicate a substantial difference between the percentage of people
who support decriminalizing sodomy or adding sexual orientation as a
protected category in antidiscrimination laws and the percentage of people who
support same-sex marriage.217 In fact, every proposed ballot initiative to ban
same-sex marriage has thus far been successful.218 What accounts for these vast
differences between attitudes toward the repeal of sodomy laws, the enactment
of antidiscrimination laws, and legalization of same-sex marriage?
There are several likely explanations.
Society views the rights
encompassed by each stage of the theory of small change differently. In
Hohfeldian terms,219 we can argue that having the right to engage in a same-sex
act, and not to be the target of discriminated based on sexual orientation, is a
sort of claim while the “right” to marry is a sort of liberty or privilege.220
Indeed, in Zablocki v. Redhail,221 Justice Stewart cites Hohfeld in a concurring
opinion to support his claim that he does “not agree with the Court that there is

215. Rick Warren’s Controversial Comments on Gay Marriage, BELIEFNET (Dec. 17, 2008, 4:20 PM),
http://blog.beliefnet.com/stevenwaldman/2008/12/rick-warrens-controversial-com.html.
216. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
217. See Paul R. Brewer & Clyde Wilcox, The Polls—Trends: Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions, 69
PUB. OPINION Q. 599, 600 (2005).
218. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Option Four: A Compromise on Gay Marriage, NAT’L REV., June 6, 2005,
at 38, 39, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/216805/option-four/rameshponnuru (“[V]oters supported initiatives against same-sex marriage in every state where they were
on the ballot.”). In Arizona, a ballot initiative did not pass in 2006, but succeeded in 2008.
219. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-33 (1913) (dividing “rights” into eight categories: right versus no-rights,
privilege versus duty, power versus disability, immunity versus liability [jural opposites], right
versus duty, privilege versus no-right, power versus liability, and immunity versus disability [jural
correlatives]).
220. See generally Allen Thomas O’Rourke, Refuge from a Jurisprudence of Doubt: Hohfeldian
Analysis of Constitutional Law, 61 S.C. L. REV. 141 (2010) (explaining how to interpret constitutional
rights in Hohfeldian terms).
221. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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a ‘right to marry’ in the constitutional sense.”222 Rather this is, for Justice
Stewart, “more accurately” described as a “privilege.”223
The right to not be discriminated against in work and accommodations and
the right to marriage hold important practical and symbolic meaning, but
freedom from the possibility of criminal charges or imprisonment is
significantly more fundamental. It is not a coincidence that in criminal cases the
burden of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt, while a preponderance of
the evidence is the standard required in most civil cases. Freedom from criminal
prosecution is more basic from a rights point of view than the right to
employment or marriage.
The right to engage in homosexual acts is part of the notion of privacy that
is itself rooted in the American legal system.224 The idea of privacy rights
originates in classical liberal principles based on the value of individual
freedom, as expressed in John Stuart Mill’s classic statement of the harm
principle.225 According to Mill’s theory, a person is free to act as he or she
wishes, so long as no one else is harmed. The possibility of creating good
outcomes does not justify state action; only the possibility of preventing harm
provides such justification. For all other activities, individuals retain “the right
to be let alone.”226 The right to do whatever one wants in one’s own private
domain amounts to the right to be let alone.227
Engaging in homosexual sex could traditionally be perceived as a negative
right to be let alone, while marriage demands more than just being let alone.228
Some scholars see the right to marry as a negative right, as opposed to an
affirmative entitlement to state-sanctioned marriage.229 Nevertheless, marriage
is not a clear-cut negative right; rather, it is a legal institution that requires the
official recognition and sanction of the state.230 Further, many legal rights and

222. Id. at 392. But see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring) (“The right to marry is not a privilege conferred by the State, but a
fundamental right that is protected against unwarranted State interference.”).
223. Id.
224. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 280 (1986). But see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 478 U.S. 186 (2003) (finding no
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sex).
225. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9-15 (Emery Neff ed., 1926).
226. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
227. Cf. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 724 (1999) (“The liberal
conception of private choice is the idea that government ought to promote interests in decisional
privacy, chiefly by allowing individuals, families, and other nongovernmental entities to make
many, though not all, of the most important decisions concerning friendship, sex, marriage,
reproduction, religion, and political association.”).
228. But see STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS
ON TAXES 48 (1999) (arguing that all rights must be positive because they all depend on an agent of
government for their enforcement).
229. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, LIBERTY FOR ALL 69 (2006) (“The Court’s marriage
jurisprudence therefore does not conceptualize the right to marry as an affirmative entitlement to a
state-sanctioned marriage. Rather, the right to marry is best conceptualized as a negative right . . .
.”).
230. Therefore, Mill himself did not think that polygamy should be criminalized, but rather
believed that the state should not recognize polygamous marriage. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note
7, at 220.

Aloni_proof_022311

144 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/23/2011 12:48:26 PM

Volume 18:105 2010

benefits come with it. Therefore, while the decriminalization of homosexual sex
seems to restore a basic right and does not require even minimal effort from the
government, marriage demands at the very least a certificate, a judge, and state
registration. While most people agree that the right to marry is part of
decisional privacy, and that marriage is a private relationship, it is also accepted
that the state may interfere with this right by imposing age restrictions,
prohibiting polygamy, etc.231 Marriage does not happen solely in the private
sphere, as it is a legal institution that always requires public affirmation:
To be marriage, the institution requires public affirmation. It requires public
knowledge—at least some publicity beyond the couple themselves; that is why
witnesses are required for the ceremony and why wedding bells ring. More
definitively, legal marriage requires state sanction, in the license and the
ceremony.232

The right to marry is also different from the right not to be discriminated
against, and the fact that a person, a government, or a society chooses to protect
a LGB person from discrimination does not lead to the conclusion that the same
entity will be open to legalizing same-sex marriage. Antidiscrimination laws are
not as basic as the right to privacy in order to engage in homosexual acts.
However, it is generally understood that antidiscrimination laws are an essential
part of a just society and thus validate the burden they might place on some
employers or society as a whole.233 Indeed, “[a]nti-discrimination laws are not
designed to protect majority views; they are written for protection of the
minority, even if generally unpopular.”234 The basic idea is to protect people
from the indignities of prejudicial mistreatment.235
The differences between public perceptions of antidiscrimination laws and
of same-sex marriage are well illustrated by the following example. When the
Senate voted on the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),236 many of its members
also pushed for the passage of the Employment Nondiscrimination Act,237 which
would provide protection to LGB individuals in employment. This, the Senate

231. See Allen, supra note 227, at 727 (“Marriage is considered a private relationship, yet
governments require licenses and medical tests, impose age limits, and prohibit polygamous,
incestuous, and same-sex marriages.”). Of course, the state also imposes some limitations on the
right to engage in certain sexual acts, such as incest, but such cases are often punished after the event
rather than prevented from occurring.
232. COTT, supra note 214, at 1-2.
233. See Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-discrimination Laws, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 145, 147 (2000); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 751 (1991) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws are of little assistance in combating broader
patterns of socioeconomic disadvantage on the basis of race and sex).
234. Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Expression in the Workplace, 92 MARQ. L.
REV. 1, 19 (2008).
235. Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, in
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1, 19 (Robert C. Post
et al. eds., 2001).
236. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2000), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
237. Senate Vote on Passage: S. 2056 [104th]: Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s1996-281 (last visited Jan. 7,
2011).
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thought, would be a way to show support for the LGB community while also
supporting DOMA.238 The Employment Nondiscrimination Act fell just one
vote short of passage in the Senate, while DOMA was passed by a margin of 8514.
It is easy for society to accept negative rights as natural.239 Sodomy laws
fall rather comfortably under the banner of sexual privacy, a negative liberal
concept, while same-sex marriage seems significantly more advanced and
affirmative.240 Antidiscrimination laws protect a person’s basic rights and prove
to be much less controversial than same-sex marriage.241 Marriage requires
affirmative acceptance—far more investment than a demand simply to be let
alone or not to be discriminated against based on sexual orientation.242
One may argue that my analysis does not refute the basic assumption of the
theory of small change, which contends that the more society progresses, the
more LGB people are accepted and consequently the more the idea that
marriage should be open to same-sex couples enters the mainstream. My
argument is, however, that because of the very different nature of the three
rights in question, we cannot assume that the legal progress and changes in
norms provided by stages one and two actually lead to same-sex marriage.
These three rights are both distinct and autonomous from each other.
Moreover, while there are surely arguments as to why sodomy laws should
be sustained or why a sexual orientation category should not be added to
antidiscrimination laws, these arguments are largely based on morality (or
homophobia, or politics of disgust)243 and have the same basis as the “no promo
homo” arguments.244 As such, these arguments are actually a modern version of
238. See JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM, AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 116-20 (2005).
239. See id. at 37-38.
240. See id.
241. A majority of Americans believe that sexual orientation should be protected under
antidiscrimination laws. See SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, QUEERS IN COURT 221 (2007) (reporting that 59
percent of heterosexual American respondents indicated in a survey that they would favor a federal
law prohibiting job discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
242. But see ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 159
(1995) (rejecting less radical and controversial elements of the gay rights movement, such as
antidiscrimination laws, because they violate the public-private distinction, but arguing for the
legalization of same-sex marriage).
243. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Many Americans
do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as
scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home.
They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be
immoral and destructive. The Court views it as ‘discrimination’ which it is the function of our
judgments to deter. So imbued is the Court with the law profession’s anti-anti-homosexual culture,
that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously ‘mainstream’; that in
most States what the Court calls ‘discrimination’ against those who engage in homosexual acts is
perfectly legal; that proposals to ban such ‘discrimination’ under Title VII have repeatedly been
rejected by Congress . . . .”).
244. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1328-29 (2000) (“No promo homo” is a
phrase meaning “No promotion of homosexuality.” No promo homo arguments have been spread
in order to prevent “pro-gay” measures in law and norms, based on the belief that “gay people do
disgusting things or are diseased or predatory.”).
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old prejudices against homosexuality based on natural law and the immorality
of LGB people, in addition to fears that they will infect others with their
“problem” or “recruit” others. According to these arguments, the state should
not repeal sodomy laws or add sexual orientation as a protected category
because the state should not promote immoral conduct that encourages the
participation of others.245
The implication is that homosexuality and
homosexual conduct are not as worthy as heterosexuality and heterosexual
conduct.246 Some of these approaches may leave the Bible out of the argument,
but they still cling to the perception that homosexuality is inherently immoral.
In contrast, arguments against same-sex marriage sometimes encompass
more than concealed bigotry and thus present real legal and societal
challenges.247
For example, traditionalists emphasize the importance of
marriage in encouraging people to procreate “responsibly.”248 They point out
that children who live in “traditional” households enjoy a higher standard of
living and better economic situation than children in “alternative” families, who
are more likely to suffer from physical and emotional problems, abuse, etc. 249
They aver that nontraditional families pose a danger to the social fabric because
of the high rate of child poverty that they experience, the financial cost of
divorce, and the high rate of teenage pregnancy and juvenile delinquency
among children born outside marriage. In this regard, traditionalists advocate
preserving marriage’s special status as a framework for reproduction. These
arguments should be understood in light of the dramatic decline in the number
of marriages in many places around the world.250 Some traditionalists perceive
a relationship between changes in family structure and the recognition of samesex partnerships. For example, Stanley Kurtz asserts that registered partnership
laws in Nordic countries have caused a decrease in marriage rates and an
increase in the number of people raising children out of wedlock.251 Kurtz
argues that acceptance of same-sex marriage tells society that marriage itself is
outdated, and that virtually any family form, including parenthood in the

245. Id. at 1329.
246. Id. at 1343.
247. There are a number of arguments against same-sex marriage, and I view many of them as
flawed and ridiculous.
248. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State
Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 771-814 (2001).
249. E.g., Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 377
(2007).
250. See Pamela J. Smock & Wendy D. Manning, Living Together Unmarried in the United States:
Demographic Perspectives and Implications for Family Policy, 26 L. & POL’Y 87 (2004) (In the United
States, there are approximately five million cohabiting couples—the highest number in American
history—yet they are entitled to only some of the legal safeguards available to married couples.);
Erik Eckholm, Saying No to “I Do,” with the Economy in Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, at A15. Cf.
Godard, supra note 77, at 311 (In France in the 1970s, close to 400,000 marriages were celebrated each
year; by 2006, this number fell to 274,400, a decline of 30 percent. The decline has been accompanied
by a rise in cohabitation and divorce.).
251. Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 23, 2004,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/660zypwj.asp.
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absence of marriage, is acceptable.252 These sorts of arguments are often driven
by different political views rather than by the politics of disgust.
Moreover, while people who vote against same-sex marriage in referenda
may certainly be motivated by disgust or homophobia, when a state defends
these arguments in courts, it must rely on non-homophobic, non-morality-based
reasons for denying same-sex couples the right to marry. As Justice Scalia
observed in his Lawrence dissent, judges, unlike the general populace, need to
extend principles to their logical end.253 Therefore, when arguments about
responsible reproduction come before a court, judges can ascertain whether such
arguments pass a rational basis test. An example of the practical application of
such a stance can be found in the New York Court of Appeals’ holding in
Hernandez v. Robles that “[i]n the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the
Legislature could rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that children
will do best with a mother and father in the home . . . . In sum, there are rational
grounds on which the Legislature could choose to restrict marriage to couples of
opposite sex.”254
Thus people may oppose gay marriage for reasons arguably unrelated to
homophobia or disgust, and judges can conclude that the legislature or the
people in referenda had a legitimate reason to restrict marriage to opposite-sex
252. Of course, as Badgett points out, the decline in marriage rates started before the recognition
of same-sex partnerships and can be attributed to many different factors. BADGETT, supra note 182, at
67-82. Moreover, the assertion that marriage’s main purpose is to regulate reproduction is mistaken.
As indicated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, procreation has never been the sole
purpose of marriage—consider that sterile couples, as well as post-menopausal women, have never
been prohibited from getting married. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962
(Mass. 2003) (“If procreation were a necessary component of civil marriage, our statutes would draw
a tighter circle around the permissible bounds of nonmarital child bearing and the creation of
families by noncoital means.”).
In addition, research has shown that there is no connection between the presence of two oppositesex parents and an optimal child-rearing environment. Rather, various factors affect a child’s overall
welfare: the child’s DNA; abilities; character; surroundings; peers, parents and other relatives; diet;
the quality of the schools the child attends; the financial status of his or her family; and so on. See
Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP.
U. L. REV. 691 (2003) (reviewing two major reports regarding LGB parents, including one issued by
the Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health of the American Academy of
Pediatrics, and concluding that there are no meaningful differences between the children of LGB
parents and those of heterosexuals parents); Michael J. Rosenfeld, Nontraditional Families and
Childhood Progress Through School, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 755 (2010); Michael S. Wald, Adults’ Sexual
Orientation and State Determinations Regarding Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 381, 388-89 (2006)
(presenting research that did not find any special psychological problems among the children of
LGB parents); Brief of Amici Curiae, Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (No. 91-1394-05),
available at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usa/legal/hawaii/baehr/1997/brief.doctors.of.sociology06.02.97.
In fact, the most significant research on the welfare of the children of lesbians from conception
through adolescence found that these children rated better than average in social skills, academics,
and general competence and registered a significantly lower rate of social problems. See Nanette
Gartrell & Henny Bos, US National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study: Psychological Adjustment of 17Year-Old Adolescents, 126 PEDIATRICS 28, 28 (2010).
253. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One of the benefits of
leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike
judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion.”).
254. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 2006).
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couples only. As such, it cannot be assumed that anyone who supports the
decriminalization of sodomy or the inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected
category in antidiscrimination laws must also support same-sex marriage with
the passage of time. Eskridge himself acknowledges the differences between
these rights:
Moderate Americans willing to promote gay people from criminals to social
misfits (like alcoholics) support sodomy decriminalization but not same-sex
marriage. Finally, the idea that marriage must be between one man and one
woman is a core part of the belief systems and even the social identities of many
Americans.255

Indeed, the perceived uniqueness of marriage makes the battle for samesex marriage different from attempts to obtain other types of rights for LGB
individuals or couples. It is thus safe to say that recognition of same-sex
marriage will never be seen as a small step, no matter what other milestones
have already been achieved.
VII. THE EFFECT OF CIVIL UNIONS ON THE PATH TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
The most problematic assumption that the theory of small change makes is
that civil unions are a temporary stage inevitably leading the way toward samesex marriage. According to Waaldijk, the fact that registered partnership law
was enacted in the Netherlands
. . . did not silence the call for the opening up of marriage. On the contrary, the
social and political pressure increased. In retrospect, it seems that the whole
legislative process leading to the introduction of registered partnership and joint
custody served to highlight the remaining discrimination caused by the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage: the awkward exceptions . . . and
the separate and equal social status of registered partnership as compared to
marriage.256

Waaldijk adds that many same-sex couples choose not to register because
of their commitment to same-sex marriage.257
Merin makes a similar argument; even though he believes alternatives to
marriage are based in a tradition of separate-but-equal and serve only to
maintain compulsory heterosexuality as the dominant culture,258 he contends
that civil unions are still a necessary step on the way to same-sex marriage,
because only then will a state be ready, “in terms of its sociopolitical and legal
climate,” to move to next stage.259 Conversely, Eskridge does not see civil
unions as falling under the umbrella of separate-but-equal, because unlike the
segregation of African Americans, the institution of civil unions seeks to

255. Eskridge, supra note 244 at 1349.
256. Waaldijk, supra note 3, at 447.
257. Id. at 449 (“Anecdotal evidence suggested that many same-sex couples were not registering
their partnerships, because they preferred to wait for real marriage.”).
258. MERIN, supra note 5, at 304 (“Separate ‘marriage-like’ institutions only serve to perpetuate
homophobia, heterosexual superiority, and gender binarism.”).
259. Id. at 326-27.
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advance liberal values, while segregation was part of an apartheid regime.260
According to Eskridge, civil unions are actually a kind of “equality practice,”
inter alia, because they are a necessary temporary stage on the way to same-sex
marriage.
The theory of small change is based on a number of premises. First, civil
unions bring to the forefront the differences between opposite- and same-sex
couples, because the public and the legislature cannot see a good reason to
maintain such an unequal status. Consequently, civil unions encourage the
legalization of same-sex marriage. Second, the theory of small change assumes
that civil unions are a necessary stage before same-sex marriage, because
without it, the public is unprepared for same-sex marriage. Third, the theory of
small change hypothesizes that the final frontier of LGB activism is the
legalization of same-sex marriage and that LGB people and organizations are
united in their desire to achieve the legalization of same-sex marriage. In other
words, by situating marriage as the final goal, the theory of small change not
only describes or evaluates the path to same-sex marriage but rather advances
an ideal—that same-sex marriage is indeed the final and ultimate goal of the
LGB movement. These assumptions, however, are not well founded. While the
introduction of civil unions could, in theory, serve to highlight the differences
and disparities between marriage and unions, in most cases it actually blurs the
lines between the two, potentially leading to the general public’s view that civil
unions are a fair compromise. Furthermore, the LGB community has less of an
incentive to fight for same-sex marriage once its members enjoy all or most of
the rights that are associated with marriage. Most importantly, it appears that in
European countries, because of the declining value of marriage and the stigma
that it often carries, some LGB organizations are not overly eager to legalize
same-sex marriage.
A. Does the Institution of Civil Unions Really Highlight the Differences?
Marriage is a legal institution with substantial economic underpinnings. It
entails many benefits, including tax and property benefits, health insurance, and
citizenship.261 The same is true with regard to civil unions. In European
countries, civil unions provide most, and sometimes all, of the economic benefits
for which opposite-sex married couples are eligible. In the United States, in
states that offer civil unions or expansive rights and benefits to domestic
partners (and those that allow same-sex marriage), all the benefits provided to
married couples by the state are conferred upon same-sex couples; yet this does
not include federal benefits, which are substantial.262
260. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 144.
261. See COTT, supra note 214, at 1-5 (describing the development of the connection between the
state interest in marriage and the benefits that followed or were denied).
262. Since DOMA defines marriage as a “legal union between one man and one woman,” most
benefits that are provided to married couples are denied to same-sex couples. This is an important
distinction that the current theories do not succeed in addressing: in a country where civil unions
offer all the rights associated with marriage (as in the European context), the distinction between
marriage and civil unions is less pronounced. In the United States, however, both civil unions and
same-sex marriage deny same-sex couples many rights from the federal government; thus the
pressure on resolving these inequalities is stronger, and it seems fruitless to compare the two.
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Many scholars share the belief that individuals have an incentive to marry
because it is an efficient institution.263 It provides economic benefits and is a
public good; the more marriage is associated with such benefits, the more
individuals seeking to improve their economic situation will desire marriage.
Therefore, “[i]ndividual same-sex couples, especially those with property or
children, would have the same economic incentives as different-sex couples to
desire access to the legal framework created by marriage, in addition to any
other customary benefits of being married.”264 Economic analysis regards both
marriage and cohabitation (and thus civil unions) as the result of rational
behavior when individuals seek financial, as well as physical and emotional,
benefits.265
If civil unions provide all the benefits associated with marriage, it stands to
reason that the LGB community will have less incentive to fight for same-sex
marriage. Not surprisingly, the economic benefits accrued by marriage have
consistently been one of the main engines of the battle for same-sex marriage.
For example, among first-world countries, one of the main factors motivating
the fight for same-sex marriage was the AIDS crisis.266 The AIDS crisis made
clear to same-sex couples how vulnerable their relationships are, often with
respect to the rights and benefits that they were denied. Gay men were required
to pay inheritance taxes on their partners’ apartments after they passed away,
were not eligible for their partners’ health insurance, could not take advantage
of rent control when their partners passed away when the lease was in the
latter’s name, and had no standing regarding property inheritance. These are
strong economic and efficiency incentives to vigorously fight for the legal
recognition of same-sex relationships. Importantly, these problems initiated a
number of legal actions with the goal of granting such benefits to individuals in
same-sex partnerships.267 When such issues no longer exist (for example, if LGB
couples in civil union regimes have full rights in this respect), however,
complacency within the LGB community sets in.
It may be argued that discrimination against same-sex couples results in
emotional damage that has corollary economic consequences as well.
Ultimately, the treatment of same-sex couples as second-class citizens should
constitute a strong enough incentive for LGB people to continue investing in the
battle for same-sex marriage. Misha Isaak, for example, argues that even if civil
unions provide full economic benefits:

263. See, e.g., Badgett, supra note 8, at 76 (“Economists from many traditions argue that the legal
institution of marriage promotes efficiency at the social level and at the family level by promoting
the specialization of labor within the household. . .”).
264. Id.
265. See Antony W. Dnes, Cohabitation and Marriage, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE 118, 120 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002).
266. See, e.g., CHAUNCEY, supra note 15, at 96-104; FRÉDÉRIC MARTEL, THE PINK AND THE BLACK:
HOMOSEXUALS IN FRANCE SINCE 1968, 208-15 (1999) (describing a similar effect in France, with a
much later response, and the “import” of ACT-UP Paris); Rydström, supra note 64, at 203-05
(describing the effect of the AIDS crisis on the struggle for recognition of same-sex relationships in
Scandinavia).
267. See, e.g., CHAUNCEY, supra note 15, at 102-3 (describing Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.
2d 49 (1989)).
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[T]hey fail to provide marriage’s intangible benefits, such as esteem, selfdefinition, and the stabilizing influence of social expectations. Although these
benefits may be less concrete than, say, tax exemptions, they are no less
constitutionally significant.268

Even assuming that Isaak is correct that civil unions do not offer the same
emotional rewards that marriage does (though some people reject that
assertion),269 the emotional aspect is a far less substantial rallying cry than the
viable benefits and rights at stake. When LGB couples have the same economic
benefits and rights as opposite-sex couples, they have less incentive to fight for
marriage. Additionally, courts and legislatures have less of an impetus to push
for same-sex marriage as there is less of an identifiable harm or damage. In
other words, it is much simpler to argue for equality in benefits and protection
than in terms of emotional equality. The main weakness in Isaak’s argument is
his failure to take into consideration the decline in the value of marriage in
many places around the world.270 For many, marriage is not tied to selfdefinition.271 Many are able to find “self-definition” through civil unions and
cohabitation.
Badgett’s study suggests that in countries where the value of marriage has
declined, the chances of achieving legal recognition of same-sex relationships
are higher.272 Thus, civil unions usually take place in countries where marriage
is less meaningful on a societal level. A large number of cohabiting unmarried
opposite-sex couples has proved to demonstrate the declining material
importance of marriage in a particular state or country.273 In such places, samesex couples who achieved all the benefits offered by marriage are probably less
passionate about the fight for same-sex marriage and marriage is probably not
tightly linked to self-esteem and identity.
For example, France has an exceptionally high number of cohabiting
opposite-sex couples, which, as mentioned previously, is a strong indicator of
the declining value of marriage.274 In 2006 the PaCS was amended to provide
almost all the economic rights accompanying marriage; same-sex couples now
enjoy many of the same benefits as their straight counterparts. Even though the

268. Misha Isaak, Comment, “What’s in a Name?” Civil Unions and the Constitutional Significant of
“Marriage,” 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 607, 612 (2008).
269. See, e.g., Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15,
19-20 (2000) (arguing that civil unions are a worthy alternative to marriage).
270. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 254 (1989) (“Declining marriage rates in all the
industrial countries are witness not only to a general postponement of marriage, but also to a certain
shift away from formal unions.”).
271. See generally Clare Chambers, Feminism, Liberalism and Marriage (2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.brown.edu/Research/ppw/files/Feminism,%20Liberalism
%20and%20Marriage.doc (“Feminists should support the abolition of state-recognised marriage.”).
272. See Badgett, supra note 8, at 77.
273. Id.
274. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 208, at 20 n.12 (In 2002, fourteen percent of people living as
couples in France were cohabiting – the highest percentage of thirty countries studied.); see also ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COHABITATION RATE AND PREVALENCE OF OTHER FORMS OF
PARTNERSHIP, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/27/41920080.pdf (Of French adults
between twenty and thirty-four years of age, 21.8 percent were cohabitating.).
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PaCS was created mainly for same-sex couples, it seems to be more popular
among opposite-sex couples275 who often choose the PaCS over marriage.276 For
every two marriages in France, a PaCS is celebrated, totaling half a million
PaCSed couples in 2009, a number that is rising steadily.277 It is likely that in
such circumstances, LGB individuals feel less discriminated against and have
less motivation to fight for same-sex marriage.
This is not to say that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is harmless.
Some critics argue that civil unions are damaging to children raised by parents
in same-sex relationships because the children see society treating their parents
as second-class citizens. A more palpable grievance recognized by the
California Supreme Court is the exposure same-sex couples may experience
every time they identify themselves as part of a civil union (in places where such
unions are open only to same-sex couples) rather than as married.278 Despite
being possibly offensive and a violation of privacy, such potential injury is not
perceived as a severe grievance compared to, for example, denial of the right to
visit a loved one in hospital or to make important medical decisions for one’s
partner when he or she is unconscious. Moreover, as the trend of opening civil
unions to opposite-sex couples continues, the privacy injury will be diminished.
Another way civil unions potentially impede the path to same-sex marriage
involves general public opinion. In essence, when LGB couples receive full
rights, it is no longer a question of whether same-sex couples deserve
recognition, but what type of legal recognition they deserve. It goes without
saying that the more support the general public has for same-sex marriage, the
more likely it is that same-sex marriage will be codified into law. However,
surveys show that the majority of the public prefers civil unions to same-sex
marriages.279

275. See, e.g., Patrick Festy, The “Civil Solidarity Pact” (PACS) in France: An Impossible Evaluation,
POPULATION & SOCIÉTÉS (Institut National D’études Démographiques, Paris, Fr.), June, 2001, available
at http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_publication/697/publi_pdf2_pop_and_soc_english_369.pdf (French law
prohibits the collection of statistical records on the type of PaCS, but estimates are published
frequently.)
276. Godard, supra note 77, at 313-14 (“It is becoming an increasingly popular option . . . it seems,
in fact, to be more popular with heterosexuals.”).
277. Edward Cody, Straight Couples in France Are Choosing Civil Unions Meant for Gays, WASH.
POST, Feb. 14, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/
AR2009021303365.html.
278. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008) (“[O]ne consequence of the coexistence of
two parallel types of familial relationships is that—in the numerous everyday social, employment,
and governmental settings in which an individual is asked whether he or she ‘is married or single’—
an individual who is a domestic partner and who accurately responds to the question by disclosing
that status will (as a realistic matter) be disclosing his or her homosexual orientation, even if he or
she would rather not do so under the circumstances and even if that information is totally irrelevant
in the setting in question.”).
279. See Brewer & Wilcox, supra note 217, at 602 (“Public support for civil unions . . . appears to
be substantially greater than public support for same-sex marriage . . . . This finding stands out most
clearly in the nine (three Gallup, two ABC News/Washington Post, four Pew, and one Quinnipiac)
polls that included questions about both same-sex marriage and civil unions: in these polls, the
percentage supporting civil unions exceeded the percentage supporting same-sex marriage by at
least 3 percentage points and by as much as 19 percentage points . . . . The average difference was 14
percentage points.”); Most Still Oppose Gay Marriage, but Support for Civil Unions Continues to Rise,
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The public is more likely to understand the need for change, and therefore
show more support for same-sex marriage, if they are exposed to the stories of
discrimination faced by real LGB people—in essence, stories that foster empathy
for the “underdog.”280 Since the beginning of the public debate over same-sex
marriage, stories of the consequences of discrimination against LGB couples
have often been the most efficient means of convincing the public of the need to
extend the institution of marriage to same-sex couples.281 Matthew Coles,
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Lesbian Gay Bisexual
Transgender & AIDS Project, has written recently about the reasons why he
believes California’s Proposition 8 succeeded, and the steps that should be taken
in order to prevent future losses of this kind. At the center of his analysis, he
suggests “people have to hear about discrimination from a personal perspective,
not as an abstract principle.”282 Indeed, the main criticism of California’s LGB
organizations is that they did not effectively publicize the pain caused by the
denial of rights to same-sex couples.283
The rights offered by civil unions make the current form of discrimination
more abstract and mundane, as they seem to address and resolve the very issues
that gave such shock value and emotional punch to these stories.284 Stories like
that of Sharon Kowalski and her life partner, Karen Thompson285—a story that
PEW RES. CENTER (Oct. 9, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1375/gay-marriage-civil-unionsopinion.
280. Gandhi was very cognizant of the fact that certain incremental improvements in the laws
toward Indians in South Africa and India would blunt the truth of the perception of injustice among
Afrikaners and the British. Therefore, he was very careful to push for certain changes in the law and
not others. See LOUIS FISCHER, GANDHI: HIS LIFE AND MESSAGE FOR THE WORLD 62 (1982) (“Ready to
die for principle, [Gandhi] preferred to compromise and arbitrate. He wished to collaborate with the
British and hoped that the twentieth century would vanquish the ancient dinosaur. But when
Dominion status [of India] was shelved, when instead repressive wartime measures were confirmed,
the Mahatma took his first deliberate action against British imperialism in India.”)
281. See e.g., CHAUNCEY, supra note 15, at 96-104 (anecdotes about gay relationships lacking legal
standing, in the context of the AIDS crisis), 111-19 (the story of Sharon Kowalski).
282. Matthew Coles, Prop 8: Let’s Not Make the Same Mistake Next Time, (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-coles/prop-8-lets-not-make-the_b_170271.html.
283. See Louis Weisberg, Prop 8, What Went Wrong, 365 GAY (Nov. 25, 2008), http://
www.365gay.com/living/prop-8-what-went-wrong/3 (“Renna and other critics say what was
fatally missing from the No on 8 campaign’s advertising was the presence of actual gay and lesbian
families telling their stories. By holding back on the emotional punch and choosing instead to focus
on cold principles, they say the campaign failed to move people on the opposing side.”).
284. That was the response of the British House of Lords in the same-sex marriage case Wilkinson
v. Kitzinger. [2006] EWHC (Fam) 2022, [75] (Eng.) (“I propose to adopt that broader approach by
treating the matter on the basis that, although Parliament had no positive obligation under the
Convention to take steps to redress the perceived social disadvantages experienced by same-sex
partners as compared with married persons, by embarking on legislation designed to alleviate such
social disadvantage and passing the measures contained in the CPA [Civil Partnership Act] which
provided for recognition and treatment of a foreign marriage as a civil partnership only, brought the
facts of the Petitioner's situation within the ambit of Article 12.”)
285. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 15, at 112-14 (In 1983, Sharon Kowalski and her life partner,
Karen Thompson, were leading closeted lesbian lives. Neither woman had told her parents about
the relationship. Thompson was a teacher and feared she would be fired if her sexual orientation
became known. The two women owned a house jointly and had lived together in a committed
relationship for more than nine years. On her way home from work, Kowalski was severely injured
in an automobile accident. The hospital to which she was admitted denied her life partner
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“brought the vulnerability of lesbian and gay couples home to everyone”286—are
no longer as common in a civil unions regime.
Two referenda in Arizona provide an example of how the enactment of
civil unions can hamper achievement of the same-sex marriage goal. In 2006,
Arizona became the first U.S. state to reject a ballot initiative aimed at
preventing the state from “creat[ing] or recogniz[ing] a legal status for
unmarried persons that is similar to marriage.”287 Voters rejected this initiative
by a slim majority of 51.8 percent. In 2008, another referendum was presented,
though this time opponents of same-sex marriage “decided to push for a simple,
straightforward amendment that would enshrine the traditional definition of
marriage without touching the domestic partnership issues.”288 In other words,
whereas the first initiative utilized expansive, broad language to deny any kind
of recognition to same-sex couples, the second referendum precluded only the
possibility of recognizing same-sex marriage. Not surprisingly, a majority (56
percent) voted in favor of the second referendum. There were several
explanations for this “flip.” Undoubtedly, the most influential factor was the
fact that the second referendum was not aimed at excluding the legal
recognition and rights of same-sex couples, but only at excluding the right of
same-sex couples to marry. The public is more likely to protect same-sex
couples when they are being denied most rights or recognition, not when they
are affirmatively seeking the ability to marry. In conclusion, the public may
view civil unions as a fair compromise, reasoning that even if they result in
some form of abstract discrimination, civil unions are a just solution.289
Choice set theory argues that public opinion becomes more systematic and
“rational” when citizens are forced to respond to a clearly binary “choice set”:
yes or no, black or white.290 Without such binary oppositions, citizens cannot
make good decisions because there is too much information, a lack of
information, or simply too many choices. Civil unions have created a new

notification, information, and visitation rights, and because of the extent of her injuries, she was
unable to communicate her own preferences. When Kowalski’s parents arrived, they intensified the
exclusion of Thompson from Kowalski’s life. The parents denied that their daughter was a lesbian
and suggested that if Thompson were allowed to see Kowalski, she would sexually molest her. The
father eventually became the court-appointed guardian and permanently enforced the separation.
Kowalski and Thompson became the public faces of the battle for the rights of marriage, and for
several years, gay pride parades were led by wheelchairs.).
286. Id. at 111.
287. ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITION GUIDE (2006), available at http://
www.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop107.pdf.
288. Kevin Vance, Why Arizona Flipped On Gay Marriage, CBS NEWS (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/02/opinion/main4643975.shtml.
289. The feeling that civil unions are not a very discriminatory regime may be reinforced by the
argument that marriage should be safeguarded as a religious institution and that civil unions are a
suitable secular alternative. See Alan M. Dershowitz, To Fix Gay Dilemma, Government Should Quit the
Marriage Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at B15; Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry, 98 CAL. L.
REV. 667, 695 (2010) (“I personally favor the solution of leaving civil unions to the state and leaving
marriage to religions and other private entities.”).
290. See Kenneth Cimino & Gary Segura, From Radical to Conservative: The Political
Construction of Civil Unions and Changing Public Attitudes (paper presented at the annual meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Sep. 1, 2005),
available at http://
www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/1/5/4/p41545_index.html.
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situation in social science theory, a unique structure that does not fit choice set
theory.291 The option of civil unions offers an intermediate step and thus a
“trichotomous” choice set, forcing the public to choose from among three
options (i.e., no legal recognition for same-sex couples, civil unions, or same-sex
marriage). It has been suggested that the presence of the third alternative might
reduce the willingness of some moderates to go as far as supporting same-sex
marriage as the option of civil unions provides a safe compromise.292 In
addition, opponents of same-sex marriage might believe that civil unions could
undermine the momentum of the struggle for same-sex marriage293 and thus
support the establishment of civil unions as a means of preventing the
legalization of same-sex marriage. These two possibilities strongly support the
notion that civil unions can have paralyzing effects on the path to same-sex
marriage.
B. Is Marriage Really the Final Frontier of European LGB Organizations? (Why
Marriage Is Not Everything)
The theory of small change does not just tell us that civil unions are a
temporary stage that facilitates progress toward same-sex marriage; by
neglecting to take into consideration the lack of enthusiasm for the legalization
of same-sex marriage among many LGB communities in Europe, it also situates
marriage as the final stage without examining whether this is indeed the case.
In doing so, it goes beyond its claims to explain the past and predict the future
by cementing the notion that marriage is the final and most important stage in
Europe, and that the United States just needs to follow the same path. The
picture is far from accurate. If there is an important lesson for the United States,
it is that marriage is not everything.
The incrementalist account of same-sex marriage legalization is manifestly
teleological—it presents marriage as the end, both literal and normative, of the
LGB movement. Behind this kind of thinking is, in part, the belief that nothing
signals approval of homosexuality more than same-sex marriage.294 This is
apparent from Eskridge’s description of his vision of social acceptance of LGB
people: acceptance becomes greater and more widespread as more legal
progress is made, until its final end—marriage—is obtained.295 This is clearly
wrong or at least varies from person to person, and from culture to culture. For
example, the French believe that adoption by same-sex couples signals approval
of homosexuality (or at least genuine indifference to it) more than the
legalization of same-sex marriage, since adoption supposedly involves questions

291. Id.
292. Id. at *23 (“As the debate endures, it is likely, we think, that this alternative will continue to
draw greater and greater interest from the middle of the American political spectrum.”).
293. Id.
294. See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY
TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 206 (1996) (arguing that gay males should get married in order to become
sexually civilized).
295. SULLIVAN, supra note 242, at 180-85 (1995) (predicting and hoping that the gay movement
can pack up and go home once marriage is attained).

Aloni_proof_022311

156 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/23/2011 12:48:26 PM

Volume 18:105 2010

concerning the sexual formation of children.296 In other words, there is a
normative commitment that informs Eskridge’s and others’ notion of progress:
the idea that marriage is the final goal of LGB activism. But this vision of
marriage as the final frontier is not representative of the goals of the LGB
community in Europe. In fact, the evidence demonstrates that many Europeans
are most interested in securing partnership rights and not marriage.
It is striking, especially from an American perspective, to recall that one of
Great Britain’s largest and most influential LGB organizations, Stonewall, does
not advocate the goal of same-sex marriage. In fact, the organization advances
the idea “that Civil Partnership [i]s preferable to marriage because it should be
seen as a twenty-first century means of recognising modern relationships and
that this [i]s preferable to attempting to radicalize the traditional notion of
marriage.”297 In outlining its key priorities, the organization does not currently
use the word “marriage.”298
Nicola Barker argues that organizations
representing the LGB community have generally welcomed the Civil
Partnership Act in England.299
Criticism has been largely confined to
substantive rather than ideological issues; but the fact that civil partnership is
nominally different from marriage has not been of particular concern to the LGB
organizations.
Similarly, the websites of some of the important LGB organizations in
Germany, England, and France do not advocate same-sex marriage. LSVD (the
Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany), one of Germany’s largest LGB
organizations, is proud of the achievement of the Lifetime Partnerships and
regularly works for the improvement of the benefits accompanying it. Its
website states:
Only ten years after our foundation we were successful in obtaining a registered
partnership law in Germany. This means that we convinced the German
Parliament and society that equal rights for gay and lesbian couples are
necessary for a modern, democratic society. Nevertheless, we still have to
struggle for equal rights in areas like taxation and pension laws, adoption and
child custody.300

The focus on rights rather than marriage should come as no surprise.
Germany, like some other European countries, has experienced an increasing
number of cohabiting couples, a high number of divorces, and the flourishing of

296. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 208, at 137-42. Cf. Polikoff, supra note 2, at 728 (“A review of the
European experience reveals one dominant pattern. Partnership rights for gay and lesbian couples
reflect a willingness to confer economic and social benefits on gay men and lesbians. Concomitantly,
disapproval, or at least, skepticism, concerning gay and lesbian parenting has resulted in explicit
denial of joint adoption rights and/or denial of access to donor insemination services.”).
297. Shipman & Smart, supra note 97, at ¶ 2.5.
298. STONEWALL, www.stonewall.org.uk/about_us (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
299. Nicola Barker, “Gay Marriage”: Civil Partnerships for Same-Sex Couples in the United
Kingdom (paper presented at the annual meeting of The Law and Society Association, May 27,
2004).
300. LSVD: THE LESBIAN & GAY FED’N IN GER., http://typo3.lsvd.de/229.0.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2010).
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alternative families.301 What is unique about Germany is that it has a strong
pluralistic view and there is no panic with regard to the consequences of such
changes on the family structure.302 In this atmosphere, it is no wonder that
many LGB people seek not marriage but equal rights.
Moreover, data shows that in European countries that have legalized samesex marriage or offer registered partnership schemes, the number of same-sex
couples who married or registered is significantly lower compared to both the
number of same-sex couples residing in the country and the number of
opposite-sex couples who have registered or married.303 While there are a
number of contradicting explanations for this phenomenon,304 it no doubt
testifies to the lack of enthusiasm demonstrated by LGB Europeans toward
marriage or other marriage-like institutions.305 In essence and in practice, LGB
Europeans choose to enjoy legal recognition, but less frequently institutionalize
their relationships.
Conversely, American LGB couples are much more likely to register or
marry than their European counterparts and have more interest than their
European counterparts in securing marriage rights.306
In American
organizations same-sex marriage has “emerged as the highest of priorities in the
gay community”307 and is an issue to which the general public devotes a fair
amount of attention.308 Another indication of the single-minded focus on samesex marriage in the United States is demonstrated by the amount of spending on
campaigns and advocacy in this area. Opponents of Proposition 8, for example,
invested more than thirty-one million dollars on this mission.309 One of the first
items appearing on the website of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education

301. See Ilona Ostner, Cohabitation in Germany—Rules, Reality and Public Discourses, 15 INT’L J. L.,
POL’Y & FAM. 88, 89 (2001).
302. Id. at 88-89 (“Germany is also a peculiar case: divorce and lone parenthood do not create
stigma”).
303. Patrick Festy, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Europe, 61 POPULATION 1, 53-55, 71-88
(2006), available at http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_REVUE=POPE&ID_NUMPUBLIE=POPE_
604&ID_ARTICLE=POPE_604_0417&REDIR=1; see also BADGETT, supra note 182, at 45 (“[T]he
number of couples registering as partners seemed surprisingly low.”).
304. Do Homosexuals Really Want to Get Married?, CROSSWALK, http://www.crosswalk.com/
1410340/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) (suggesting that LGB people do not want to get married). But see
BADGETT, supra note 182, at 46-56 (suggesting that over the time LGB people will get married in
greater numbers).
305. Cohabitating LGB people in those states enjoy a large number of legal rights and do not
need to marry or register.
306. BADGETT, supra note 182, at 54 (“When given the opportunity, same-sex couples in the
United States appear to be much more likely to marry or register than do those in Europe.”).
307. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 237
(2006).
308. Id. at 236 (“In a very short period of time, this issue has moved to the center of the gay and
lesbian rights movement as well as larger mainstream political and legal debates.”).
309. Dan Morain & Jessica Garrison, Prop. 8 Foes, Fans Amass $60 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/25/local/me-marriagemoney25; see also Pro-Marriage
Equality Groups Spent Big in Vermont, Got Big Results, LEZGETREAL (July, 2009), http://
lezgetreal.com/2009/07/pro-marriage-equality-groups-spent-big-in-vermont-got-big-results
(“Of
the groups supporting marriage equality, Vermont Freedom To Marry spent the most money. Their
entire amount came to just under $300,000.”).
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Fund, the oldest and largest LGB organization in the country, for example, is the
New Jersey Civil Union Watch, the mission of which is “work[ing] toward the
goal of marriage equality.”310 Unlike its European counterparts, Lambda Legal
regularly works toward both civil unions and marriages, though it sees marriage
as the ultimate goal.
Normatively, there are good reasons for working on securing partnership
rights rather than focusing solely on same-sex marriage, or positing marriage as
the final goal of the LGB movement. Marriage does not offer relief from
discrimination against LGB individuals who do not seek or live in marriage-like
arrangements. Moreover, LGB people who do not live in marriage-like
relationships will be subjected to additional discrimination if the marriedversus-unmarried distinction gains cultural value.311 Likewise, legalization of
same-sex marriage may validate those couples who fit in best with straight
culture and implicitly penalize those who are not married, thus privileging to an
even greater extent already normative authorizations. Marriage wages an attack
on sexual LGB culture in its failing attempt to create “good gays” and reinforces
the hierarchy of sexual shame by delegitimizing otherwise potentially fulfilling
non-monogamous sexual lives.312 There is cause for additional concern when a
group finally wins its rights: the group often creates new hierarchies that mirror
those of the dominant culture.313 In this way, some group members become
second-class citizens if they do not adopt the behavior of the dominant
culture.314
Similarly, legalization of same-sex marriage may exert pressure on people
to get married and may limit the options for couplehood. In fact, it is argued
that same-sex marriage will narrow, perhaps irretrievably, the scope of future
possibilities for intimate life and the family for LGB people.315 For example,
same-sex marriage does not provide for the recognition of other forms of
kinship that are not currently recognized by the law, such as the complex kin
relations between close friends that are common in San Francisco.316

310. Marriage, Relationships, and Family Law, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/ourwork/issues/marriage-relationships-family/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
311. See generally Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: Rhetorics of
Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 97.
312. See, e,g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF
QUEER LIFE (2000).
313. See Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE
229, 241 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
314. We can read the normalization of same-sex marriage by looking at the leading counsel in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the case challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 in federal court.
Lead counsel and the person who initiated the lawsuit is Theodore Olson, who served as solicitor
general under President George W. Bush. He joined the fight for the legalization of same-sex
marriage because he “believe[s] that a conservative value is stable relationships and stable
community and loving individuals coming together and forming a basis that is a building block of
our society, which includes marriage.” FoxNews Sunday: Ted Olson: Same-Sex Marriage is a
Conservative
Value
(FoxNews
television
broadcast
Aug.
8,
2010),
available
at
http://videocafe.crooksandliars.com/node/38878.
315. See Franke, supra note 307, at 240.
316. See KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1997).
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Some feminist scholars view marriage as a harmful institution and thus
urge the LGB community not to pursue it. Philosopher Clare Chambers
suggests, based on a review of numerous feminist accounts of marriage, that
marriage’s practical effects on women make them worse off317 because marriage
reinforces the gendered division of labor and thus women earn less than men
and are less independent. Marriage also reinforces the notion that housework is
primarily the domain of women, even if they work outside the home.318 Yet
there are pressures for women to get married, and women are commonly seen
as flawed and unsuccessful if they are not married.319 Therefore, Chambers
concludes that “both women and gay men are better off, and justice is served, if
marriage ceases to exist as an institution.”320
In conclusion, it seems that the theory of small change offers an inaccurate
map of the process to same-sex marriage. Although a variety of opinions exists
among European LGB people,321 and steps have been taken to legalize same-sex
marriage in several European countries, it appears that LGB individuals and
organizations are not united in their views concerning same-sex marriage and
that the overall level of investment in legalizing same-sex marriage is very
different in Europe. In light of the strong arguments against making marriage
the ultimate goal of the LGB movement, the European LGB community’s
317. See generally Chambers, supra note 271.
318. Id. at *3 (“[A]s Claudia Card insists, it would be wrong to think that practical harms have
ceased as laws have changed: the progress embodied in the criminalization of marital rape and
violence, she writes, ‘has been mostly on paper. Wives continue to die daily at a dizzying rate.’”).
319. Id. at *5 (“One particularly pernicious form of symbolic violence that marriage enacts on
women in contemporary western societies is the sense that they are flawed and failing if unmarried.
This perception may be encouraged by pressure from peers, family, news reports, novels, television,
film and self-help books. Research shows that many heterosexual women see single life as a
temporary phase preceding marriage, and that being single for longer or when older is construed as
sad and shameful, and at least partially the fault of the single woman herself.”).
320. Id. at 10.
321. It seems that debate over this issue within the LGB movement could result in controversy
causing divisions within the community and resulting in a weaker movement. The question is to
what extent, if at all, such debate impedes the activity of LGB organizations. The experience of other
social movements teaches that fragmentation within a movement may preclude it from achieving its
goals. David S. Meyer, Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity
and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement, 8 SOC. F. 157, 158 (1993) (suggesting, based on the
experience of the nuclear freeze movement, that fragmentation may have an adverse effect on social
movements); JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN EMERGING
SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 129-43 (suggesting that disputes
within the feminist movement of the second wave, especially between radical and non-radical
feminists, and the controversy about the role of lesbians within the movement tore “apart, slowly
but surely, the reticulate interstices of the movement. The segmented groups were becoming
fragmented groups; increasing in number and decreasing in communication.”).
Such fracturing may have even more serious effects when the movement is becoming
institutionalized, i.e., when it is working within the mainstream and abiding by the rules. Meyer,
supra, at 175-76. However, researchers of social movements also suggest that divisions may have
positive effects: they can facilitate the development of new ideas and can allow movements to
accommodate people with conflicting ideas. FREEMAN, supra, at 127 (“Its segmentary nature also
encourages proliferation, adaptation, and responsiveness to its environment.”). I do not think that
such conflicts are a very significant factor in the LGB struggle for same-sex marriage, but only wish
to demonstrate that, along with other factors impeding efforts to achieve legal recognition of samesex marriage, the establishment of civil unions may have an overall paralyzing effect.
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restraint in its efforts to secure the right to marry, and its commitment to secure
rights, offers a valuable lesson.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To date, the notion that the recognition of same-sex marriage can be
predicted on the basis of the experiences of different countries has not been
challenged. On the contrary, there is general acceptance of the theory of small
change within the scholarly community. Yet a brief survey of events casts more
than a little doubt on the accepted theory. The only significant attempt to
challenge this theory, Badgett’s empirical method, seems to fall into a similar
pattern of generalization. It appears that the attempt to generalize the
experience of arriving at legal recognition of same-sex marriage not only misses
key components in the equation but also makes faulty assumptions. This article
proposes that overall, the theory of small change and the empirical method
described by Badgett are not reliable ways of predicting the legalization of
same-sex marriage and are not capable of explaining in a satisfying fashion the
legal and societal process that have led to the legalization of same-sex marriage
in some European countries.
More troubling is the suggestion that the process of achieving legal
recognition of same-sex marriage can be definable, as this can lead to
complacency within the LGB rights movement. After all, if it is believed that
one factor predicts another, it is easy to accept it as an unfortunate stage
necessary to reach an ultimate goal. Once we recognize that no such factor
inevitably leads to that goal, we must accept that no stage prior to the
acceptance of same-sex marriage should be taken as a harbinger of the
legalization of same-sex marriage.
The effect of civil unions in Europe is not completely clear at this point.
However, it is apparent that it is not a springboard to the next stage but rather a
legal institution with a number of important implications. In the United States
the effects are far from obvious. Therefore, the LGB community and its
supporters should not take anything for granted; instead, they must challenge
any commonly held assumptions regarding the path leading to legal recognition
of same-sex marriage. This discussion is relevant not only on a scholarly level
but also on a practical one. For example, based on a rationale similar to that
offered by the incremental approach, LGB organizations objected to turning to
the federal court in the case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger.322 However, if we
understand that nothing is really predictable or obvious, a move to the federal
court becomes more acceptable. In other words, if the incremental approach is
dispensible, and its progress can be slow, perhaps the time has come for a more
aggressive approach—at the federal level. Ultimately, an even better idea
would be to leave behind the struggle for same-sex marriage and focus attention

322. E.g., Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2009, at A1 (“‘We think its [sic] risky and premature,’ said Jennifer C. Pizer, marriage project director
for Lambda Legal in Los Angeles, adding that a loss at the Supreme Court level could take decades
to undo.”).
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on a broader change—the opening of an alternative to marriage for both
opposite- and same-sex couples.
Furthermore, because the theory of small change assumes a chronological
process and presumes the end goal to be marriage, the stages of the incremental
process validate a particular course of action and undermine actions that seek to
achieve each right for its own sake. For example, the model delegitimizes
attempts to win hospital visitation rights for same-sex couples that do not have
marriage as their end goal or the right of individuals in same-sex relationships
to exemptions from the inheritance tax in the case of partner’s death, because it
asserts that marriage and the bundle of rights that it offers will satisfy all the
needs of LGB people. By viewing marriage as the final frontier, the theory of
small change also posits marriage—a stage that symbolizes the normalization of
LGB people—as the most important and final goal of the LGB movement. The
European experience tells a more complex story if we are willing to take a closer
look at it. Many European LGB organizations object to or simply are not very
enthusiastic about working toward legal recognition of same-sex marriage and
are more interested in securing partnership rights for same-sex couples. Thus,
future research needs to look at the creation of marriage alternatives as “equality
practice,” not in the sense that Eskridge advocates but rather in the sense of
creating other legal institutions (not just marriage by a different name) that treat
opposite- and same-sex couples equally.

